



## NEC's monthly monitor of Palestinian perceptions Towards politics and economics

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## Table of contents

<i>Table of contents</i> .....	2
<i>List of Figures</i> .....	3
<i>List of Tables</i> .....	4
<b>I. Introduction and methodology</b> .....	5
<b>II. Main Findings</b> .....	6
<b>III. The situation in general</b> .....	8
<b>A. Level of concern</b> .....	8
<b>B. Feeling of security</b> .....	10
<b>IV. Palestinian politics</b> .....	10
<b>A. Leadership</b> .....	10
<b>B. The Ramallah vs. Gaza governments</b> .....	12
<b>C. Factional politics</b> .....	13
1. Perceptions towards factional dialogue .....	13
2. The strategy that promotes the Palestinian national interest most .....	14
3. Factional support .....	15
4. Views about Fateh in relation to Hamas .....	16
<b>D. Voting preferences</b> .....	19
<b>E. Other Palestinian internal issues</b> .....	21
1. The Fateh conference .....	21
2. Attitude towards the accusations of Farouk Kaddoumi .....	22
3. Closure of Al-Jazeera .....	23
<b>V. Israeli Palestinian relations</b> .....	24
<b>A. The peace process</b> .....	24
<b>B. Hamas and Israel</b> .....	25
<b>VI. The Obama administration and Palestine</b> .....	26
<b>VII. The economy</b> .....	28
<b>A. Poverty conditions</b> .....	28
<b>B. Employment</b> .....	29



## List of Figures

Figure 1: Demographic distribution..... 5

Figure 2: Level of concern..... 8

Figure 3: Main issue that makes you feel concerned: Jan 2008 till Jul 2009..... 9

Figure 4: Feeling of security: Jan 2008 till Jul 2009..... 10

Figure 5: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh: Jan 2008 till Jul 2009..... 11

Figure 6: Perceptions about the most prominent Palestinian leader in the current period..... 12

Figure 7: Attitude about the government perceived to be legitimate..... 13

Figure 8: Attitude about whether the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas will achieve national reconciliation..... 14

Figure 9: Preferred strategy to achieve the supreme national interests..... 15

Figure 10: Factional trust: Jan 2006 till Jul 2009..... 16

Figure 11: Perceptions about the factions that are more coherent and disciplined..... 17

Figure 12: Perception about the cohesiveness of Fateh and Hamas..... 18

Figure 13: Perceptions about the level of harmony within the Fateh leadership and the Hamas leadership..... 19

Figure 14: Voting preference in case legislative elections were held next week..... 20

Figure 15: Voting preference in case presidential elections were held next week..... 20

Figure 11: The impact of the Fateh conference on the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas..... 21

Figure 17: Attitude about the accuracy of the accusations made by Kaddoumi against Abbas ... 22

Figure 18: Reasons behind the accusations made by Farouk Kaddoumi..... 23

Figure 19: Attitude towards the closure of Al-Jazeera Office in Ramallah..... 23

Figure 20: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel..... 24

Figure 21: about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of the Israel .... 25

Figure 22: Perceptions of the United States seriousness to push forward the peace process..... 26

Figure 23: Attitude as to whether the Obama administration differs from the Bush administration in terms of dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict..... 26

Figure 24: Evaluation of the Obama administration as opposed to that of Bush..... 27

Figure 25: Poverty level: March 2006 till Jul 2009..... 28

Figure 26: Labor force: August2008 till Jul 2009..... 29



## List of Tables

Table 1: Level of concern according of region of residence and factional trust..... 8

Table 2: Main issue that makes you feel concerned according of region of residence and factional trust..... 9

Table 3: Feeling of security according of region of residence and factional trust ..... 10

Table 4: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh according of region of residence and factional trust ..... 11

Table 5: Perceptions about the most prominent Palestinian leader in the current period according of region of residence and factional trust ..... 12

Table 6: Attitude about the government perceived to be legitimate according of region of residence and factional trust..... 13

Table 7: Attitude about whether the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas will achieve national reconciliation according of region of residence and factional trust..... 14

Table 8: Preferred strategy to achieve the supreme national interests, according of region of residence and factional trust..... 15

Table 9: Factional trust according of region of residence ..... 16

Table 9: Perceptions about the factions that are more coherent and disciplined according of region of residence and factional trust ..... 17

Table 11: Perception about the cohesion of Fateh and Hamas according of region of residence and factional trust ..... 18

Table 12: Perceptions about the level of harmony within the Fateh leadership and the Hamas leadership according of region of residence and factional trust..... 19

Table 13: Voting preference in case legislative elections were held next week according of region of residence and factional trust..... 20

Table 14: Voting preference in case presidential elections were held next week according of region of residence and factional trust ..... 21

Table 10: The impact of the Fateh conference on the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas according of region of residence and factional trust..... 22

Table 16: Attitude about the accuracy of the accusations made by Kaddoumi against Abbas according of region of residence and factional trust..... 22

Table 17: Reasons behind the accusations made by Farouk Kaddoumi according of region of residence and factional trust..... 23

Table 18: Attitude towards the closure of Al-Jazeera Office in Ramallah according of region of residence and factional trust..... 24

Table 19: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according of region of residence and factional trust ..... 25

Table 20: Attitude about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of the Israel according of region of residence and factional trust..... 25

Table 21: Perceptions of the United States seriousness to push forward the peace process according of region of residence and factional trust..... 26

Table 22: Attitude as to whether the Obama administration differs from the Bush administration in terms of dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict according of region of residence and factional trust..... 27

Table 23: Evaluation of the Obama administration as opposed to that of Bush according of region of residence and factional trust..... 27

Table 24: Poverty level according of region of residence and factional trust..... 28

Table 25: Labor force according of region of residence and factional trust ..... 29



## I. Introduction and methodology


The survey was conducted between 2-6 August 2009 on a sample of 934 Palestinians over the age of 18 in both the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The data collection method was through telephone interviews. The numbers were randomly selected from all household numbers using random digit dialing.

In addition to the regular questions used by NEC on a monthly basis, the August survey included questions pertaining to the Fateh conference, the Obama administration, elections, etc...

The results of the survey are compared to the other results obtained from NEC's monthly surveys and are analyzed according to a number of explanatory variables that include region of residence, and factional trust. The margin of error is +/- 3.3% with a 95% confidence level.

Following are the demographic characteristics of this survey.

Figure 1: Demographic distribution





## II. Main Findings

- 80% of Palestinians are concerned about the situation in general;
- The level of concern is deeper among the supporters of Fateh and among those that do not trust any faction than among the Hamas respondents;
- The main issue of concern is the internal power struggle. This concern is more intense in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and among the Fateh supporters than the Hamas supporters;
- Although more Palestinians trust Abu Mazen than Ismael Hanieh, 44% of the respondents do not trust either leader;
- As for the most prominent Palestinian leader, Abbas received the highest percentage (30%) followed by Marwan Bargouthi (16%) and Hanieh (12%). Leaders like the political head of Hamas, Meshaal, and the Fateh leader, Muhammad Dahlan, did not get significant support;
- The most perceived legitimate government in the Palestinian territories is the caretaker government of Salam Fayyad;
- More than 70% of the Palestinians that do not trust any faction believe that Hamas is more coherent and more disciplined than Fateh. Issues that will certainly have an impact on any future elections;
- More than half of the Palestinian people believe that the Fateh Strategy is more appropriate for promoting Palestinian national interest while 17% identified the Hamas strategy as the strategy that is more beneficial and a full 30% said neither strategy is good for the Palestinian national interest;
- Hamas is perceived more positively on a number of issues than Fateh (cohesion, discipline, unity among leaders) although the level of trust in Fateh is significantly higher than the level of trust in Hamas;
- Most Palestinians say that they will vote for Fateh during the next legislative and presidential elections;
- However, a significant proportion of Palestinians that say that they will vote for Fateh and Fateh candidates, believes Fateh to be less coherent, organized, and structured. Most likely, this will in reality lead to a much lower support for Fateh. **While the attitude might be in favor of Fateh, the behavior might be considerably different.**
- 72% of the respondents believe that the Fateh conference will lead to reform in the movement. This view is shared by 92% of the Fateh supporters;
- Most Palestinians believe that Kaddoumi claims that Abu Mazen and others were involved in the death of Arafat were baseless;
- The majority of the Palestinian public was strongly against the decision of the Abbas administration to temporarily close the offices of Al-Jazeera for broadcasting the accusations of Kaddoumi;
- About 70% of the Palestinians support a peace settlement with Israel and the majority want Hamas to change its position towards the state of Israel;
- Most Palestinians do not believe that there is a difference between the administrations of Obama and bush with respect to Palestine. Still, about half believes that the Obama administration is better, as opposed to 1% that thinks that the Bush administration was more favorable to Palestine;



- 46% of the respondents are determined to be living in poverty: 43% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip. Extreme poverty is higher among the respondents that do not trust any faction;
- About 20% of the labor force is believed to be unemployed. No significant differences were observed with respect to region of residence or factional affiliation;



### III. The situation in general

#### A. Level of concern

Concern over the situation among the respondents remained as high as the previous month. Although the level of concern has slightly dropped in recent months, about 80% of the Palestinians remain concerned about the current situation as noted in figure 2, below.

The level of concern is as high in the West Bank as in the Gaza Strip although in the Gaza Strip the level of concern is more intense. As noted in table 1, below, 55% of the respondents in the Gaza Strip are extremely concerned compared to 49% in the West Bank.

As for factional trust, the results reveal that the level of concern is deeper among the supporters of Fateh and among those that do not trust any faction than among the Hamas respondents. It seems that Fateh feels more concerned than Hamas. Whereas respectively 82% and 78% of the Fateh respondents and the non-aligned respondents are concerned about the current situation, the percentage among the Hamas supporters is 69%, as outlined in table 1.

Figure 2: Level of concern




Table 1: Level of concern according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Extremely concerned	49%	55%	54%	37%	60%	50%
Concerned to some extent	31%	26%	28%	32%	30%	28%
Not very concerned	9%	8%	8%	13%	5%	10%
Not concerned at all	11%	10%	11%	19%	5%	12%





The main issue that makes the respondents feel concerned is the internal power struggle followed by the economic situation. This concern is more intense in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank and among the Fateh supporters than the Hamas supporters. Supporters that do not trust any faction are closer in their concern to Fateh than to the Hamas supporters. As noted in table 2, only 15% of the Hamas supporters said that they are concerned about the internal power struggle while the percentage who holds the same feeling among the Fateh supporters reaches 34%.

While the impact of the Israeli occupation<sup>1</sup> on the Palestinian's level of concern is rather small, it is nonetheless higher among the supporters of Hamas than among the supporters of Fateh. While 16% of the former attributed their concern to the Israeli occupation, the proportion who share that view among the Fateh supporters is only 9%.

Figure 3: Main issue that makes you feel concerned: Jan 2008 till Jul 2009




Table 2: Main issue that makes you feel concerned according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
The economic hardship of my Family	28%	23%	25%	27%	33%	26%
The absence of security for me and my family	10%	10%	11%	11%	4%	12%
The internal power struggle	26%	34%	34%	15%	34%	25%
The Israeli occupation	13%	13%	9%	16%	17%	13%
Family problems (Health, children, divorce...)	4%	3%	3%	2%	3%	4%
I have no concerns	19%	17%	18%	28%	8%	20%

<sup>1</sup> Israeli occupation is not given to the respondents as an option while the other options were provided during the interview.



### B. Feeling of security

Nearly half of the respondents in the oPt feel insecure. This is slightly less than the results of the previous month. The level of insecurity is the same in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, as indicated in table 3, below. As for insecurity according to factional trust, more Hamas supporters feel secure than Fateh supporters. Whereas 44% of the later feel insecure, the percentage among the later is 55%. The level of insecurity among the respondents that do not trust any faction falls somewhere in the middle, as also outlined in table 3.

Figure 4: Feeling of security: Jan 2008 till Jul 2009




Table 3: Feeling of security according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
I feel secure	49%	48%	45%	56%	54%	50%
I do not feel secure	51%	52%	55%	44%	46%	50%

## IV. Palestinian politics

### A. Leadership

Despite the fact that in relation to Ismael Hanieh President Abbas is significantly more trusted the majority of Palestinians do not trust either leader. About 44% of the



respondents said that they do not trust neither Mahmoud Abbas nor Ismael Hanieh, as illustrated in figure 5, below. However, in comparison to Hanieh, President Abbas is three times more trusted than the deposed Prime Minister.

Trust in Abu Mazen is more pronounced in the West Bank while the trust in Hanieh is more evident in the Gaza Strip. As pointed out in table 4, below, respectively 83% and 67% trust President Abbas in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip while trust in Hanieh is respectively 17% and 36%. Trust in Abu Mazen is also higher among the respondents that do not trust any faction.

Figure 5: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh: Jan 2008 till Jul 2009




Table 4: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Abu Mazen	83%	64%	97%	8%	58%	77%
Ismael Hanieh	17%	36%	3%	92%	42%	23%

When asked about the most prominent Palestinian leader, Abbas received the highest percentage (30%) followed by Marwan Bargouthi (16%) and Hanieh (12%). Leaders like the political head of Hamas, Meshaal, and the Fateh leader, Muhammad Dahlan, did not



get significant support. Results according to region and factional support are overviewed in table 5, below.

Figure 6: Perceptions about the most prominent Palestinian leader in the current period




Table 5: Perceptions about the most prominent Palestinian leader in the current period according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Marwan Bargouthi	21%	19%	20%	8%	29%	24%
Ismael Hanieh	11%	24%	2%	70%	20%	13%
Salam Fayyad	12%	8%	13%	4%	10%	11%
Mahmoud Zahhar	1%	0%	0%	1%	0%	1%
Mohammad Dahlan	1%	4%	4%	0%	0%	2%
Mustafa Bargouthi	4%	4%	3%	0%	7%	5%
Khaled Meshaal	2%	3%	0%	7%	3%	3%
Mahmoud Abbas	43%	31%	56%	5%	20%	31%
Farouq Kaddoumi	2%	1%	1%	3%	3%	2%
Other personality	3%	5%	2%	3%	8%	7%

### B. The Ramallah vs. Gaza governments

According to the Palestinian public, the most legitimate government in the Palestinian territories is the caretaker government of Salam Fayyad. The apparent success of the Fateh Conference in Bethlehem last month probably helped in increasing the legitimacy of the Fayyad government significantly in comparison with the June 2009 results. In June 2009, 46% of the respondents said that the Fayyad government is the legitimate government. By the end of July, the percentage increased to 56%. As for the Hanieh government, the percentage remained stable at 20%. As indicated in table 6, below, the majority of Gaza Strip respondents also believe that the Fayyad government is more legitimate than the Hanieh government.

**47% of the respondents that do not trust any faction do not think that either government is legitimate**



Naturally, the respondents who trust Fateh believe that Fayyad Government is the legitimate one. The most notable result is that the respondents who do not trust any of the factions also believe that the Fayyad government is the legitimate government.

Figure 7: Attitude about the government perceived to be legitimate




Table 6: Attitude about the government perceived to be legitimate according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fayyad's caretaker government	59%	52%	89%	9%	36%	35%
Hanieh government	16%	26%	1%	83%	32%	18%
Both governments are illegitimate	25%	22%	10%	7%	32%	47%

### C. Factional politics

#### 1. Perceptions towards factional dialogue

Previous surveys had shown that national reconciliation is an important issue to most Palestinians. Support for the main two faction increases whenever attempts are made to bridge the differences between Fateh and Hamas. The value of national dialogue in as far as the Palestinian public is concerned is not to be underestimated.

More than half of the Palestinian public does not believe that the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas will lead to national reconciliation. Only 45% of the respondents are positive about this prospect, as noted in figure 8, below. These results are consistent



irrespective of the region of residence or factional support. As noted in table 7, below, the pessimistic attitude about the dialogue is shared by Hamas and Fateh supporters as well as by the respondents that do not trust any faction.

Figure 8: Attitude about whether the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas will achieve national reconciliation




Table 7: Attitude about whether the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas will achieve national reconciliation according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Yes	48%	42%	46%	45%	46%	46%
No	52%	58%	54%	55%	54%	54%

2. The strategy that promotes the Palestinian national interest most

More than half of the Palestinian people believe that the Fateh Strategy is more appropriate for promoting Palestinian national interest while 17% identified the Hamas strategy as the strategy that is more beneficial and a full 30% said neither strategy is good for the Palestinian national interest. As illustrated in figure 9, below, preference for the Fateh strategy as opposed to the Hamas strategy is 77% for the former and 23% for the later.

In the West Bank, 81% of the respondents prefer the Fateh strategy, and 70% share the same view in the Gaza Strip. Only 19% of the West Bank respondents prefer the strategy of Hamas strategy while 30% share that preference in the Strip.

As for factional support, of course, Fateh supporters prefer the Fateh strategy over the Hamas strategy while the Hamas supporters prefer the strategy of Hamas, as noted in table 8. More importantly, however, is the preference of the largest segment of the Palestinian society, namely those that do not trust any political or religious faction. Of those who do not trust any faction, approximately 78% opted for the Fateh strategy over the Hamas strategy while 22% of them preferred the strategy of Hamas.



Figure 9: Preferred strategy to achieve the supreme national interests




Table 8: Preferred strategy to achieve the supreme national interests, according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fateh strategy	81%	70%	97%	11%	61%	78%
Hamas strategy	19%	30%	3%	89%	39%	22%

### 3. Factional support

The preference for the strategy of Fateh and the unanticipated success of the Fateh Conference and the election of new Fateh leadership has been instrumental in further enhancing the position of Fateh despite the significant criticism signaled at Fateh by the majority of the Palestinian public as will be discussed later in this bulletin<sup>2</sup>. These developments have led to an increase in the level of trust for Fateh from 38% in June-July 2009 to 41% in July-August 2009. The increase in support for Fateh came at the expense of the respondents that do not trust any faction not at the expense of Hamas whose public trust during that period remained stable.

When analyzing the results according to the region of residence of the respondents, the results reveal a strong support for Fateh in the Gaza Strip (39%) despite the fact that

<sup>2</sup> See also NEC's monthly bulletin of June 2009 for the perceptions of the Palestinian public towards Fateh in comparison to Hamas.



support for Hamas there (16%) is twice the support it has in the West Bank (8%). These results are elaborated in table 9, below.

Figure 10: Factional trust: Jan 2006 till Jul 2009




Table 9: Factional trust according of region of residence

	Region of Residence	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip
Fateh	43%	39%
Hamas	8%	16%
Others	11%	11%
I trust no faction	38%	34%

4. Views about Fateh in relation to Hamas

As discussed earlier, Hamas is perceived more positively by the Palestinian public in terms of a number of issues. As illustrated in figure 11, below, Hamas is viewed as

**Hamas is still perceived more positively on a number of issues than Fateh**





more coherent and more disciplined than Fateh despite the higher trust in Fateh than in Hamas.

Although the majority of the Palestinians that do not trust any faction have preference to issues that are in agreement with Fateh, the results showed that this segment of the Palestinian society still believes that Hamas is more coherent and more disciplines. As pointed out in table 9, more than 70% of the Palestinians that do not trust any faction believe that Hamas is more coherent and more disciplined than Fateh. An issue that may have an impact on any future elections, as it did in January 2006.

Figure 11: Perceptions about the factions that are more coherent and disciplined




Table 10: Perceptions about the factions that are more coherent and disciplined according of region of residence and factional trust

		Region of Residence		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Coherent	Fateh	55%	31%	74%	7%	26%	27%
	Hamas	45%	69%	26%	93%	74%	73%
Disciplined	Fateh	56%	33%	74%	8%	26%	28%
	Hamas	44%	67%	26%	92%	74%	72%

Not only do Palestinians find Hamas to be more disciplined and more coherent, they also find Hamas to be the organization that is more cohesive. According to 53% of the Palestinian public, Hamas is seen as an organization that has a single reference while only 36% think that about Hamas. As illustrated in figure 12, 64% of the Palestinians feel that Fateh is composed of a number of competing interests. This view is especially strong among the respondents that do not trust any faction (80%) and the respondents that reside in the Gaza Strip (69%).

**39% of the respondents trusting Fateh believe that Fateh is composed of a number of competing interests**



Figure 12: Perception about the cohesiveness of Fateh and Hamas




Table 11: Perception about the cohesion of Fateh and Hamas according of region of residence and factional trust

		Region of Residence		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fateh	Has a single reference	40%	31%	61%	11%	28%	20%
	A number of competing trends	60%	69%	39%	89%	72%	80%
Hamas	Has a single reference	49%	58%	44%	84%	59%	48%
	A number of competing trends	51%	42%	56%	16%	41%	52%

Perceptions towards the level of harmony within the Fateh leadership and within the Hamas leadership provide additional indicators about how the Palestinian public might behave in future elections. Once again, the Palestinian public sees Hamas even more positively than Fateh on yet another major issue. In response to the questions about whether there are contradictions within the Fateh leadership, 81% of the respondents answered affirmatively while only 65% said so about the Hamas leadership.

This view is shared by the respondents in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip but more so by the respondents that do not trust any faction. As pointed out in table 12, below, 89% of the respondents believe that there are contradictions within the Fateh leadership as opposed to 71% who said so about the Hamas leadership. Noteworthy is the percentage of the Fateh respondents who also feel that there are contradictions within their leadership. As also indicated in table 12, 32% of the Fateh respondents believe that there is no harmony among the Fateh leadership. The percentage of Hamas supporters who said that about their organization did not exceed 11%.



Figure 13: Perceptions about the level of harmony within the Fateh leadership and the Hamas leadership




Table 12: Perceptions about the level of harmony within the Fateh leadership and the Hamas leadership according to region of residence and factional trust

		Region of Residence		Factional trust			
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fateh	Yes	81%	81%	68%	92%	88%	89%
	No	19%	19%	32%	8%	13%	11%
Hamas	Yes	69%	61%	74%	33%	46%	71%
	No	31%	39%	26%	67%	54%	29%

#### D. Voting preferences

Although Fateh is criticized in many respects, more Palestinians say that they will vote Fateh if elections were held soon. Whereas 66% of the respondent said that they will vote for Fateh and for its candidates, only 16% said that their votes will go for Hamas while 17% said that they will not participate in the elections. The strong support for Fateh might be explained by the strong public endorsement of the Fateh strategy. During elections people may very well vote on the bases of the candidates not on the bases of platforms, as was the case in previous elections.

**A significant proportion of Palestinians that say that they will vote for Fateh and Fateh candidates, believes Fateh to be less coherent, organized, and structured. It is believed that this will in reality lead to a much lower support for Fateh. While the attitude might be in favor of Fateh, the behavior might be significantly different.**

As pointed out in table 13, below, Fateh appears to be more popular in the West Bank (72%) than in the Gaza Strip (59%) while Hamas is twice as strong in terms of voting in the Gaza Strip as in the West Bank.



Figure 14: Voting preference in case legislative elections were held next week




Table 13: Voting preference in case legislative elections were held next week according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Fateh list	72%	59%	95%	6%	37%	42%
Hamas list	11%	22%	0%	88%	26%	8%
Other	16%	19%	5%	6%	37%	50%

The attitude towards presidential elections is also similar. As depicted in figure 15, below, 67% of the respondents said that they will vote for the Fateh candidate during the next presidential elections while 15% said that they will vote for Hamas.

As with the legislative elections, more Westbankers than Gaza respondents said that they will vote for the Fateh candidate. As for the respondents that do not trust any faction, about half said that they will vote for a candidate other than for the Fateh or the Hamas candidate while 41% said that they will vote for the Fateh presidential candidate. These results are overviewed in table 14, below.

Figure 15: Voting preference in case presidential elections were held next week






Table 14: Voting preference in case presidential elections were held next week according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Candidate of the Fateh movement	74%	60%	95%	10%	41%	41%
Candidate of the Hamas movement	10%	22%	1%	89%	18%	9%
Another candidate	15%	17%	4%	1%	41%	50%

**E. Other Palestinian internal issues**

**1. The Fateh conference**

The Fateh Conference and the ensuing election results seem to have a positive impact on the movement in as far as public support to the organization, at least in the short term. This was manifested in the increase in support for Fateh and for its strategy.

72% of the respondents believe that the Fateh conference will lead to reform in the movement. This view is shared by 92% of the Fateh supporters

The positive attitude people have about Fateh following the Bethlehem conference explains why 64% of the respondents said that the conference will have a positive impact on the future dialogue between Fateh and Hamas. Even 47% of the respondents that trust Hamas most share this view and 59% of the respondents that do not trust any faction.

The relatively high expectations about the impact of the Fateh conference on the future dialogue between Fateh and Hamas may be explained by the dramatic change in the movement's leadership structure both with respect to the Central Committee membership and the membership of the Revolutionary Council

Figure 16: The impact of the Fateh conference on the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas






Table 15: The impact of the Fateh conference on the dialogue between Fateh and Hamas according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
A positive impact	67%	60%	75%	47%	62%	59%
A negative impact	33%	40%	25%	53%	38%	41%

2. Attitude towards the accusations of Farouk Kaddoumi

The accusation of Farouk Kaddoumi, the recently deposed head of the PLO’s political department against Mahmoud Abbas did not appear to have much impact on President Abbas. Only 20% of the respondents said that the accusations made by Kaddoumi were accurate.

**Kaddoumi accused Abbas and other leaders in Fateh of involvement in the death of Yaser Arafat in 2005**

Only supporters of Hamas were more likely to state that the accusations were correct. Among Fateh supporters only 5% believed in the accuracy of these claims while 95% rejected them. Even among the respondents that do not trust any faction, 83% of the respondents also rejected these accusations, as specified in table 16, below.

Figure 17: Attitude about the accuracy of the accusations made by Kaddoumi against Abbas




Table 16: Attitude about the accuracy of the accusations made by Kaddoumi against Abbas according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Correct accusations	17%	24%	5%	75%	35%	17%
Wrong accusations	83%	76%	95%	25%	65%	83%

To most respondents, the accusations made by Kaddoumi were intended to disrupt the Fateh Conference. Almost one third of the respondents share this view including 50% of the supporters of Hamas and 70% of the respondents that do not trust any political or religious faction so do 82% of the respondents favoring Fateh. These results are overviewed in figure 18 and table 17, below.



Figure 18: Reasons behind the accusations made by Farouk Kaddoumi




Table 17: Reasons behind the accusations made by Farouk Kaddoumi according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	
To thwart the sixth conference of Fateh	76%	69%	82%	50%	69%	70%	
Not related to the Fateh conference	24%	31%	18%	50%	31%	30%	

### 3. Closure of Al-Jazeera

In addition to the short term confusion brought about the Kaddoumi accusations, the affair also led to the closure of the Al-Jazeera offices in Ramallah for broadcasting these accusations.

Despite the Palestinian public distrust in those accusations, the Palestinian public was strongly against the decision of the Abbas administration to temporarily close the offices of the Qatar-based network. Over 80% of the respondents, as illustrated in figure 19, below, opposed this decision. Approximately 70% of the supporters of Fateh also shared this view, as indicated in table 18.

Figure 19: Attitude towards the closure of Al-Jazeera Office in Ramallah






Table 18: Attitude towards the closure of Al-Jazeera Office in Ramallah according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Yes	14%	24%	31%	1%	11%	9%
No	86%	76%	69%	99%	89%	91%

## V. Israeli Palestinian relations

### A. The peace process

The July-August survey showed a 3% increase in the level of support for a peace settlement with Israel. About 69% of the respondents support a peace agreement while 31% oppose it.

The level of support is obviously stronger among the supporters of Fateh (85%). Still, a sizable minority of Hamas supporters also support reaching a peace settlement with Israel (39%). Level of support for a peace agreement among the respondents that do not trust any faction reached 68%. Ironically, however, is that support for peace in the Gaza Strip is higher than that in the West Bank, as pointed out in table 19, below. When asking about the peace settlements with Israel, 71% of the respondents in Gaza Strip agree on the idea, in case the settlement will conserve the Palestinian legal rights, compared to 68% in the West Bank. Fateh supporters are more attracted to the suggestion than Hamas supporters, who still connected with the idea of elimination of Israel. By concentrating on figure 22, it is noticed that the percentage increased in the last month than in June.

Figure 20: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel








Table 19: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Support	68%	71%	85%	36%	48%	68%
Oppose	32%	29%	15%	64%	52%	32%

**B. Hamas and Israel**

The level of support for a peace agreement is also reflected in the question that NEC raises monthly about the existence of the state of Israel. As illustrated in figure 21, below, the majority of the Palestinians want Hamas to change its position towards the state of Israel. As indicated in table 20, this view is shared by the Gaza and West Bank respondents, the Fateh respondents, and the respondents that do not trust any faction. Even 20% of the respondents trusting Hamas are of the opinion that Hamas should change its position vis-à-vis the existence of Israel.

Figure 21: about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of the Israel




Table 20: Attitude about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of the Israel according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Hamas should maintain its position on Israel	31%	35%	14%	80%	44%	34%
Hamas should change its position regarding Israel	69%	65%	86%	20%	56%	66%



## VI. The Obama administration and Palestine

It is clear that the majority of the Palestinian (69%) doesn't feel confident towards the Obama administration especially with respect to pushing the peace process forward. Only 31% consider the United States as serious in this regard. Even 53% of Fateh supporters see that the Obama administration is not serious so do 90% of the Hamas supporters and 88% of the respondents that do not trust any faction, as noted in table 21, below.

Figure 22: Perceptions of the United States seriousness to push forward the peace process





Table 21: Perceptions of the United States seriousness to push forward the peace process according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Serious	31%	32%	47%	10%	23%	22%
Not serious	69%	68%	53%	90%	77%	78%

Moreover, nearly half of the respondents think that there is a difference between the Obama and the Bush administrations towards the Palestine-Israel conflict. Of those who trust Hamas 75% see that the Obama administration is not different from the Bush administration. While 66% of Fateh supporters think that the Obama administration differs from the Bush administration, the proportion of the respondents that do not trust any faction are closer to the position of the Hamas respondents than to the Fateh respondents, as indicated in table 22, below.

Figure 23: Attitude as to whether the Obama administration differs from the Bush administration in terms of dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict






*Table 22: Attitude as to whether the Obama administration differs from the Bush administration in terms of dealing with the Palestinian-Israeli conflict according of region of residence and factional trust*

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
There is a difference	50%	45%	66%	25%	37%	38%
There is no difference	50%	55%	34%	75%	63%	62%

Despite this view of the Obama administration, 47% of the Palestinian public believes that Obama administration is better for Palestine than the Bush’s administration. Only 1% o the respondents believe that the Bush administration was better. Even among the supporters of Hamas, 23% believe the Obama administration to be better as opposes to only 2% who believe that the administration of Bush served the Palestinian cause more.

*Figure 24: Evaluation of the Obama administration as opposed to that of Bush*



*Table 23: Evaluation of the Obama administration as opposed to that of Bush according of region of residence and factional trust*

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Obama administration is better for Palestine	49%	45%	66%	23%	34%	38%
Bush administration is better for Palestine	1%	0%	0%	2%	2%	1%
There is no difference	50%	55%	34%	75%	64%	61%



## VII. The economy

### A. Poverty conditions

The level of poverty has remained rather constant over the past four months. Currently, 46% of the respondents are determined to be living in poverty: 43% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip.

*Extreme poverty is more spread in the Gaza Strip and among the respondents that do not trust any faction.*

When analyzing the results according to factional trust, the results reveal that the difference between the respondents of Fateh and Hamas are not very striking. However, the level of extreme poverty among the respondents that do no trust any faction is significant. As noted in table 24, extreme poverty among the respondents trusting Fateh and Hamas are respectively 17% and 14% while the extreme poverty level among the respondents that do not trust any faction reaches 23%.

Figure 25: Poverty level: March 2006 till Jul 2009




Table 24: Poverty level according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Hardship cases	16%	25%	17%	14%	21%	23%
Below poverty level	27%	26%	25%	32%	31%	25%
Above poverty level	57%	49%	58%	54%	48%	52%



## B. Employment

The unemployment situation also remained more or less steady over the past four months. Currently, about 20% of the labor force is believed to be unemployed. No significant differences were observed with respect to region of residence or factional affiliation.

Figure 26: Labor force: August 2008 till Jul 2009




Table 25: Labor force according of region of residence and factional trust

	Region of Residence			Factional trust		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Employed full-time	63%	71%	71%	68%	55%	62%
Employed part-time	17%	9%	10%	18%	29%	12%
Not employed	20%	19%	18%	13%	16%	25%

\*\*\*\*