



NEC's monthly monitor of Palestinian perceptions towards politics and economics

Special focus: Identity and Ideology

Bulletin Vol. IV no. 6

June-July 2009

NEC's Bulletin and the surveys associated with it are conducted independently with the private resources of the NEC company, and are not supported or funded by any local or international organization.

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About Near East Consulting (NEC)

NEC is a survey and research firm based in Ramallah, Palestine. Drawing on extensive, inter-disciplinary experience in the Near East region and beyond, we work in a range of fields, including but not limited to such areas as democracy and democratization, food security, health and education, women and children, poverty and the labor market, peace and conflict resolution, arms control and disarmament, electoral processes, Palestinian refugees, demography, legal and judicial systems, and the impact of aid and assistance.



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I. Introduction and methodology


The survey was conducted between 2nd July and 7th July 2009 on a sample of 949 Palestinians over the age of 18. The interviews were conducted by phone on randomly selected respondents from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

In addition to the regular questions that are monitored monthly by NEC, the survey covered issues of identity and ideology among the Palestinian people. A set of questions were included to examine how Palestinians identify themselves, how they perceive liberal values, the rights of minorities, etc.

The results of this survey are analyzed according to place of residence, factional affiliation, and the gender of the respondents. These variables were determined to be the ones that have the strongest statistical significance with most of the addressed questions.

Figure 1, outlines the demographic characteristics of the sample, which correspond well with the overall characteristics of the Palestinian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (oPt).

Figure 1: Demographics





II. Main findings

- The internal security and power struggle is the main concern of Palestinian people, following is the concern about the economic hardship of their households.
- The majority 70% considers that executive power should only belong to the Palestinian security service.
- 84% of Fateh related respondents appreciate the unarming and demilitarization of the factional forces. Comparing this to approximately 1/3rd, 35%, of Hamas supporters, who are in favor of the demilitarization of factional forces.
- In general, more than half (51%) of Palestinians don't trust their political leaders. Out of the 49% of people who have trust in either Mahmoud Abbas or his Hamas political opponent Ismail Hanieh, Abbas hold 75% support. This shows that Abbas inspires more confidence within Palesitnan society than his opponent.
- There has been a significant increase in the level of factional support. Trust for Fateh is on the rise since the beginning of 2009. Since January 2006 the factional trust to Hamas shrank from 41% to barely 11 % in June 2009.
- The majority (79%) believe that pursuing the strategy of Fateh is much more convenient for Palestinian rights than the strategy followed by Hamas. This feeling reflects not only the supporters of Fateh, but also the supporters of other factions, as well among those who do not trust any of the factions.
- Regarding the question of who represents the Palestinian people, the majority, 54%, think that the PLO is the most viable representative. Among the factions, Abu Mazen's administration got 14%, and only 9% believe that Hamas represent the Palestinian people. Interesting hereby is the regional fact, that 60% of the Gazans have the opinion that the PLO is the representative of the Palestinian people.
- Just 20% of the interviewees think that the elected Hamas government of 2006 is more legitimate than the caretaker government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad who reached 46%.
- After at least 20 Years of abstinence the 6th Fateh conference will be held in Bethlehem on the 4th of August 2009. More than half, 56%, are convinced that the conference would reunify the Fateh movement.
- When asked about preferred personality in presidential elections, 35% said they would vote for the current President Mahmoud Abbas. In second position, with 24% of the respondents is the imprisoned Marwan Barghouti and only in 3rd place follows Ismael Hanieh from Hamas with 12%.
- 77% are convinced that there is no partner for peace on the Israeli side, and 75% believe that on the Palestinian side there is a partner for peace as illustrated in the figure, below.
- Regarding the identity, 42% see themselves as Muslims first, followed by their Palestinian identity with 35%.
- The majority 61%, of Palestinians characterize themselves as religious people. 14% describe themselves as secular people.



- The majority, 64%, is against a separation of state and religion. Laicism as a governmental order is only supported by 16% of the survey respondents. 19% support the separation to a certain extent.
- 49% of the respondents mention that they favor Quran and Sunna as the main source of law for Palestinian society. Only 14% think that civil law should be the only source of law in the oPt. At least 34% prefer that both, the civil law, and the Quran and Sunna should be the sources of the Palestinian judicial system.
- 36% of the respondents favor a governmental system like one in the other Arab countries. Second mentioned as preference is the caliphate system in the oPt. Only 2% want a government modeled on the system of the USA, but 14% suggest a European style governmental system.
- 77% agree that religion should be the source of laws. 76% agree that political pluralism should be guaranteed in the Palestinian political system. 98% support that religious and tolerance should be taught in school. 78% don't agree that people are the source of all laws.





III. General situation

A. Levels of concern

Over the last 11 months, there has been a slight decrease in the level of concern with the current Palestinian situation in the oPt. As illustrated in figure 2, below, the level of concern decreased in June-July 2009 compared with February and March 2008. In the following month there was a slight fluctuation in the level of concern among the Palestinian population. The main finding in table 1 is, that 61% of the population in the Gaza strip is extremely concerned about the current situation. The West Bank inhabitants are up to 19% less concerned about their situation.

Figure 2: Level of concern about the current situation




Table 1: Level of concern about the current situation according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Extremely concerned	42%	61%	47%	52%	64%	50%	51%	46%
Concerned to some extent	35%	23%	35%	17%	26%	28%	33%	29%
Not very concerned	12%	7%	11%	11%	8%	10%	9%	12%
Not concerned at all	11%	8%	6%	20%	3%	11%	7%	13%

As outlined in Figure 3 and table 2, below, the main issue that concerns the Palestinian population is the internal power struggle, especially among the population in the Gaza Strip. Among the factions, the Fateh supporters are 35 % more concerned than their



opponents from Hamas. Hamas partisans are more concerned, 32%, about the Economic hardship of their households, then about the internal power struggle 22%. Significant is that all factions, including (others) are concerned about the internal power struggle and as well about the economic hardship of there households. Remarkable is that 24% of Hamas supporters are absolutely not concerned about the current situation.

Figure 3: Main issue that makes you feel concerned




Table 2: Main issue that makes you feel concerned according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
The economic hardship of my household	33%	27%	27%	32%	27%	33%	33%	29%
The absence of security for me and my family	11%	13%	16%	5%	16%	10%	12%	11%
The internal power struggle	28%	34%	35%	22%	33%	28%	34%	26%
The Israeli occupation	9%	16%	8%	13%	15%	13%	10%	13%
Family problems	5%	2%	4%	4%	2%	5%	3%	5%
I have no concerns	14%	9%	10%	24%	6%	12%	9%	16%



B. Feeling of security

The concern over the internal security situation is reflected in the percentage of people who say that they feel insecure. In June 2009, 53% of surveyed people felt insecure with the current situation while the substandard arithmetic average of the last 24 months was 60%. At the beginning of 2009, a few weeks after the IDF war in Gaza, people felt up to 71% insecure, since then it has decreased by about 18 %.

Figure 4: Feeling of security




Table 3, below, shows that the Hamas supporters feel about 10% safer than those of Fateh, and 6% safer than those interviewed from other factions. 56 % of Gaza inhabitants feel insecure about the current situation. The feeling of insecurity in the West Bank sits at 50%.

Table 3: Feeling of security according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
I feel secure	50%	44%	47%	57%	51%	47%	47%	48%
I don't feel secure	50%	56%	53%	43%	49%	53%	53%	52%




C. Attitude towards the security situation

1. Palestinians and unauthorized weapons

Most Palestinians do not support the militarization of forces other than the security forces. Figure 5, below, underlines that 70 % of the interviewed people support the demilitarization and unarming of the factions. The majority considers that executive power should only belong to the Palestinian security service.

Figure 5: Support or opposition to the demilitarization of the factions and having weapons only with the Palestinian security services.



An astonishing result can be seen through comparing the factions in their concerns about the necessity of unarming the security forces of these factions. 84% of Fateh related respondents appreciate the unarming and demilitarization of the factional forces. Comparing this to approximately 1/3rd, 35%, of Hamas supporters, that are in favor of the demilitarization of factional forces.

Table 4 : Support or opposition to the demilitarization of the factions and having weapons only within the Palestinian security services according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Support	73%	64%	84%	35%	67%	67%	71%	70%
Oppose	27%	36%	16%	65%	33%	33%	29%	30%



2. Evaluation of the security forces

Almost half of the responding people, 49%, are satisfied with the performance of the Palestinian security forces. Even 39% in the West Bank assess them as doing very good work. In Gaza only 21% are very satisfied with the performance of the Palestinian security forces.

Figure 6: Evaluation of the Palestinian security forces in your area of residence




Table 5: Evaluation of the Palestinian security forces in your area of residence according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Very good	33%	21%	32%	43%	32%	22%	33%	25%
Good	49%	48%	40%	36%	51%	57%	44%	53%
Bad	11%	18%	17%	8%	11%	13%	12%	14%
Very bad	7%	13%	11%	13%	5%	9%	11%	7%

3. Concern about intensification of internal infighting

The recent Qalqilya violent confrontations between the PA's security forces and forces belonging to Hamas were seen as a dangerous signs that could spread to other parts of the West Bank. About 56% of the surveyed people believe that such clashes could happen again and spread to other parts of the West Bank. Table 6 shows that 20% more of the female respondents are concerned about the spread of factional infighting than males, and 19% more of Hamas supporters are concerned about the issue than Fateh supporters. Still, the fear is stronger among Gazans than among Westbankers.



Figure 7: Concern that factional infighting and clashes like recently in Qalqilya will spread to other parts of the West Bank





Table 6 : Concern that factional infighting and clashes like the recent ones in Qalqilya will spread to other parts of the West Bank

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Yes	51%	68%	45%	64%	59%	62%	46%	66%
No	49%	32%	55%	36%	41%	38%	54%	34%

D. Migration

As a result of the increasing hardship on the Palestinian population, a significant proportion of Palestinians have started thinking about emigrating. This survey shows that 65% don't think about migration. In Gaza less than half, 44% of the population, think about actually migrating. In the West Bank only a 1/3rd of the population have thought about migration.

Figure 8: Thoughts about migration



The highest proportion of the interviewees who would like to emigrate is primarily Gaza residents. Whereas only 30% of the West Bank inhabitants thought about migration, the proportion among Gazan people is 44%. Moreover, Fateh supporters were twice as likely to consider immigration as Hamas supporters.

Table 7: Thoughts about migration according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Yes	30%	44%	41%	20%	39%	35%	41%	30%
No	70%	56%	59%	80%	61%	65%	59%	70%

IV. Palestinian politics

A. Leadership

In general, more than half (51%) of Palestinians don't trust their political leaders. Out of the 49% of people who have trust in either Mahmoud Abbas or his Hamas political opponent Ismael Hanieh, Abbas hold 75% support. This shows that Abbas inspires more confidence within Palestinian society than his opponent.

Figure 9: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh




Table 8 illustrates that inside the main factions 21% on the Fateh side and 24% on the Hamas side don't have trust in their leaders. Significantly, among the female population, Abu Mazen is much more unpopular (28%) than within the male population (48%). Among the respondents without known factional relation, 75% haven't any allegiance to either Abu Mazen or Ismael Hanieh.



Table 8: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Abu Mazen	37%	36%	78%	1%	24%	18%	48%	28%
Ismael Hanieh	9%	17%	1%	74%	10%	7%	11%	13%
Neither	54%	47%	21%	24%	67%	75%	42%	59%

B. Factional support

There has been a significant change in the level of factional support during 2009. Trust for Fateh is on the rise since the beginning of 2009. Since January 2006 the factional trust to Hamas shrank from 41% to barely 11% in June 2009. On the opposite side, none factional population mistrust in the factions increased from 13% in January 2006 to 46% in June 2009. That denotes the fact that factional mistrust within Palestinian society reached a 3 year high.

Figure 10: Factional support






Table 9, below, shows the divergence between the male and female Fateh supporters. Only 31% of females compared to 46% of the male Fateh supporters trust their faction.

Table 9: Factional trust

	Region		Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Male	Female
Fateh	38%	38%	46%	31%
Hamas	8%	16%	10%	13%
Others	5%	4%	6%	4%
I trust no faction	49%	42%	38%	53%

Figure 11 and table 18, below, indicate that 61% don't believe that Fateh and Hamas will reach an agreement by 28th July, the official deadline for the negotiation talks between the factions in Cairo. 45% of the female population is expecting that an agreement will be reached by 28th July 09.

Figure 11: Success or failure of reaching an agreement between Fateh and Hamas by July 28




Table 10: Success or failure of reaching an agreement between Fateh and Hamas by July 28 according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
An agreement will be reached	40%	37%	35%	36%	37%	42%	32%	45%
No agreement will be reached	60%	63%	65%	64%	63%	58%	68%	55%



Figure 12 and table 11, below, indicate the feelings that the respondents have with regards to the path those factions should follow to achieve Palestinian national interests. The majority (79%) believe that pursuing the strategy of Fateh is much more convenient for Palestinian rights than the strategy followed by Hamas. This feeling reflects not only the supporters of Fateh, but also the supporters of other factions, as well among those who do not trust any of the factions.

About half the Palestinians have problems with the strategies of Fateh and Hamas

Figure 12: The best strategy that works for Palestinian national interest




Table 11 :The best strategy that works for Palestinian national interest according to region, faction, and gender.

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
The strategy of Fateh	44%	43%	82%	5%	25%	22%	50%	37%
The strategy of Hamas	9%	17%	1%	74%	16%	6%	9%	14%
Neither strategy	48%	41%	17%	22%	59%	72%	41%	49%



While the Hamas strategy is perceived as being less favorable to the Palestinian national interest, more Palestinians feel that Hamas actions are more problematic to Israel than those of Fateh. The next two graphics below, figure 13 and table 12, indicate that 50% of the respondents believe that Hamas policy toward Israel is much more problematic than Fateh's policy. At the same time 35% Fateh supporters have the opinion that their own faction also has a problematic policy to Israel.

Figure 13: Which is more problematic to Israel: Fateh's policies or the Hamas' policies?




Table 12: Which is more problematic to Israel: Fateh's policies or the Hamas' policies according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Fateh policies	18%	19%	35%	4%	6%	12%	27%	10%
Hamas policies	49%	51%	42%	83%	51%	49%	41%	58%
Both	17%	18%	14%	6%	11%	20%	18%	16%
Neither	16%	12%	9%	7%	31%	19%	14%	16%

C. Attitude towards the statement of Mashaal towards a two state solution

Although it appears that Fateh is more popular among the Palestinian people, it is nonetheless perceived rather negatively, as is Hamas, on a number of issues. The graphics below indicate that 70% of respondents believe that endorsement by Khaled Mashaal, the head of Hamas's political division, of a two-state solution recognizes Israel's right to exist. Note that only 35% of Hamas supporters comprehend seriously the



recognition of Israel's right to exist, as stated by their leader Khaled Mashaal in his recent speech.

Figure 14: Is Khaled Mashaal's endorsement of a two-state solution (in his recent speech) recognition of Israel's right to exist?




Table 13: Is Khaled Mashaal's endorsement of a two-state solution (in his recent speech) recognition of Israel's right to exist according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Yes	73%	65%	81%	35%	66%	69%	80%	60%
No	27%	35%	19%	65%	34%	31%	20%	40%

D. Attitudes towards Fateh and Hamas

The preceding analysis indicates that the Palestinian public is generally independent and not in favor of either one of the main factions despite the fact that support for Fateh seem to be more vocal than the support for Hamas. Public support for Fateh is attributed partly to the role that it played as a liberation movement and partly to its vision about peace in the region. As for Hamas, the majority do not believe that its tactics and strategies are helpful in ending occupation.

Accordingly, it is not surprising to see that both parties are often perceived rather negatively on some issues and less so on others. The following figures and tables are illustrate how the factions are perceived by the public regarding their internal competing interests and which faction represents the Palestinian people more. 68% of respondents think that Fateh has a number of competing interests. Significantly, almost the half, 48% of Fateh supporters thinks so. Among the Hamas faction supporters only 13% think that there is a number of competing interests within Hamas. Despite that, 59% of the overall respondents think that there are differences inside Hamas concerning the factional unity.



Figure 15: Is Fateh one unified faction or is it composed of a number of competing interests?




Table 14: Is Fateh one unified faction or is it composed of a number of competing interests according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Unified faction	28%	31%	49%	7%	11%	18%	27%	31%
Number of competing Interests	68%	68%	48%	91%	86%	78%	71%	65%
Other	4%	1%	3%	2%	3%	3%	2%	4%

Figure 16: Is Hamas one unified faction or is it composed of a number of competing interests?






Table 15: Is Hamas one unified faction or is it composed of a number of competing interests according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region			Factional trust			Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Unified faction	34%	45%	26%	82%	16%	38%	36%	41%
Number of competing Interests	62%	53%	72%	13%	78%	58%	61%	57%
Other	4%	2%	2%	5%	6%	3%	3%	3%

In an attempt to better understand the views of the Palestinians, especially those who do not trust any faction regarding whether their views are closer to Fateh or to Hamas, respondents were asked about who represents the Palestinian people. As noted below, the majority, 54%, think that the PLO is the most viable representative. Among the factions, Abu Mazen's administration got 14%, and only 9% believe that Hamas represent the Palestinian people. Interesting hereby is the regional fact, that 60% of the Gazans have the opinion that the PLO is the representative of the Palestinian people. As for those who do not trust any faction, their position towards the PLO was exactly in the middle between that of the Fateh supporters and of Hamas supporters (45%).

Figure 17: Who represents the Palestinian people?




Table 16: Who represents the Palestinian people according to region, faction, and gender?


	Region			Factional trust			Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
The PLO	51%	60%	74%	14%	53%	45%	60%	49%
The Hamas government	6%	13%	1%	54%	3%	5%	6%	12%
Abu Mazen's administration	19%	7%	20%	5%	14%	11%	13%	16%
Others	24%	19%	4%	28%	30%	38%	21%	24%

The following figures and tables illustrate the characteristics of the main factions in the oPt, as perceived by the respondents. 67% of the respondents are convinced that Hamas is more unified compared to only 33% on the side of Fateh. The majority, 67%



assess Fateh as being more nationalistic than Hamas. 64% of respondents have the opinion that the Hamas movement is more disciplined than the Fateh movement, with 34% saying so. Regarding the transparency/accountability and effectiveness, Fateh has more confidence from the population than Hamas.

Figure 18: Who is more unified? (Fateh vs. Hamas).



According to table 17, below, 45% of the Hamas supporters think that there is unity in the Fateh faction. None partisans think similarly about the nationalistic character of the major factions. Of none factional interviewees 55% believe that Fateh is more nationalistic and 45% believe that Hamas is more nationalistic. None factional mentioned that Fateh is more transparent than Hamas and Fateh is less effective than the opponents of Hamas.

Table 17: Palestinian perceptions of Fateh and Hamas

		Region		Factional trust				Gender	
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
More unified	Fateh	36%	29%	55%	1%	14%	19%	32%	34%
	Hamas	64%	71%	45%	99%	86%	81%	68%	66%
More nationalistic	Fateh	69%	63%	96%	0%	53%	55%	74%	60%
	Hamas	31%	37%	4%	100%	47%	45%	26%	40%
More disciplined	Fateh	38%	33%	60%	4%	14%	21%	35%	37%
	Hamas	62%	67%	40%	96%	86%	79%	65%	63%
More transparent	Fateh	64%	61%	87%	7%	43%	52%	65%	60%
	Hamas	36%	39%	13%	93%	57%	48%	35%	40%
More effective	Fateh	61%	39%	78%	5%	32%	41%	54%	50%
	Hamas	39%	61%	22%	95%	68%	59%	46%	50%



A question on the influence of Iran on Hamas was also included to further gauge the attitude of the non-partisans towards Fateh and Hamas. Figure 19 and table 18, below, indicate what the Palestinians think about the Iranian influence on Hamas policy. 47% answered exclusively that Iran has a negative influence on Hamas. Among the factions 67% Fateh supporters, 41% of none partisan and 9% of Hamas supporters think that there is a negative influence on Hamas from Iran. A view that falls between that of the position of Fateh and that of Hamas.

Figure 19: Type of influence of Iran on Hamas.




Table 18: Type of influence of Iran on Hamas according to region, faction, and gender.

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
A positive influence	28%	36%	25%	57%	37%	27%	29%	33%
A negative influence	48%	46%	67%	9%	42%	41%	54%	40%
Has no influence at all on Hamas	24%	18%	7%	34%	20%	32%	17%	26%

E. The Gaza vs. the Ramallah governments

1. Attitude about the legitimate one

In addition to the views people have about Fateh and Hamas, other issues were also scrutinized regarding the government that is perceived as more legitimate. Just 20% of the interviewees think that the elected Hamas government of 2006 is more legitimate



than the caretaker government of Prime Minister Salam Fayyad which is perceived as the legitimate one by 46% of the respondents.

Figure 20: Which is the most legitimate government?




Table 19, below, indicates that the legitimization that the Ismael Hanieh government achieve is higher in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank with respectively 26% and 16% saying so. As for the respondents that do not trust any faction, 18% see the Hamas government as the legitimate government for the Palestinians as opposed to 29% who see the Fayyad government as legitimate and 53% saying neither is legitimate.

Table 19: Which is the most legitimate government according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
The caretaker government of Salam Fayyad	47%	45%	81%	6%	25%	29%	53%	40%
The Hanieh government	16%	26%	3%	85%	28%	18%	17%	21%
Neither is legitimate	37%	29%	16%	9%	46%	53%	30%	39%

2. Attitude towards the effectiveness of both governments towards security

Regarding both territories and enhancing the security, the standing of the Fayyad government in the West Bank among the interviewees is much better than Hanieh's one in the Gaza Strip. Less than half, just 45%, mentioned that Hamas governmental work enhances the security level in the Gaza Strip.



Figure 21: Does the Fayyad and the Hanieh governments work well to enhance the level of security in the West Bank and Gaza respectively?




Table 20 below, illustrates that the majority of the Fatah supporters, 89%, and none factional respondents, 64%, view the caretaker government of Salam Fayyad as doing good work in enhancing the level of security in the West Bank. In the Gaza Strip only the Hamas supporters are completely convinced, 93%, that the Hanieh government is enhancing the level of security in their environment.

Table 20: Does the Fayyad government and the Hanieh government work well to enhance the level of security in the areas under their control according to region, faction, and gender?

		Region		Factional trust				Gender	
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fatah	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Fayyad government	Yes	73%	64%	89%	22%	60%	64%	74%	66%
	No	27%	36%	11%	78%	40%	36%	26%	34%
Hanieh government	Yes	37%	54%	26%	93%	51%	47%	43%	46%
	No	63%	46%	74%	7%	49%	53%	57%	54%

F. The Fateh conference

After at least 20 Years of abstinence the 6th Fateh conference was held in Bethlehem on the 4th of August 2009. Figure 22 and table 21, below, illustrate the belief of interviewees about the impact of the event. As mentioned in table 18 and figure 19 the respondents of the survey have the impression that there is a big disaccord inside Fateh. Figure 22 and table 21, below, indicates that the conference could countervail this trend of incoherence inside Fateh. More than half are convinced that the conference would reunify the Fateh movement.



Figure 22: Impact of the Fateh conference in Bethlehem next month on Fateh.




Table 21 below, reflects the opinion especially between both main factions of the upcoming conference in Bethlehem. 77% of the Fateh supporters have a positive feeling, that it will bring the faction closer together, and on the other side, the opponents, supporters of Hamas think that the conference will increase the fragmentation of Fateh.

Table 21: Impact of the Fateh conference in Bethlehem next month on Fateh according to region, faction, and gender.

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Bring Fateh closer together	57%	54%	77%	25%	59%	43%	52%	60%
Will only increase the fragmentation of Fateh	22%	30%	14%	55%	23%	28%	30%	20%
Will not make a difference	21%	17%	10%	20%	18%	28%	18%	20%

G. Future elections

1. Level of support for Presidential and PLC elections

Over 90% the Palestinian people support elections in general, even after the disavowal (non-recognition) of the PLC elections 2006 by the Western world. Presidential, PLC or local elections are similarly important for the respondents of the survey, as portrayed in



figure 23, below. Table 22 below, indicates that among all cases region, factional trust and gender the majority, always more than 83%, support all three kinds of elections.

Figure 23: Support for elections




Table 22: Support for elections according to region, factional trust. And gender

		Region		Factional trust				Gender	
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Presidential elections	Support	88%	93%	92%	89%	80%	90%	90%	90%
	Oppose	12%	7%	8%	11%	20%	10%	10%	10%
PLC elections	Support	88%	93%	94%	85%	83%	89%	90%	90%
	Oppose	12%	7%	6%	15%	17%	11%	10%	10%
Local elections	Support	92%	92%	96%	83%	92%	91%	94%	91%
	Oppose	8%	8%	4%	17%	8%	9%	6%	9%

Not unexpectedly, Hamas and Fateh supporters favor different elections to be held first. Whereas Hamas supporters find the Presidential elections more important, the Fateh supporters find the Palestinian Legislative Council elections more urgent, as indicated in table 23, below.

Table 23 The type of elections that is more important to hold nowadays according to region, faction, and gender.


	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Presidential elections	39%	45%	41%	55%	30%	40%	38%	45%
Legislative elections	47%	49%	52%	39%	59%	45%	52%	44%
Local elections	14%	5%	7%	5%	10%	15%	10%	11%



2. Election preferences: Factions

The seemingly declining support for Hamas is reflected by the preferences people have in case elections were held today. As outlined in figure 24, below, 46% would vote Fateh and only 11% would decide to vote for Hamas. Interesting is that second biggest group 33% won't vote if elections would be held today.

Figure 24: If elections were held today, which faction would you vote for?



Inside the Hamas supporters, twice as many females, 14%, would vote for the Hamas faction if elections were held today. 37% of none voters live in the West Bank and just 27% of the Gazan inhabitants are non-voter. The majority, 67%, of none factional would not vote. Only 3% of the non-partisans said that they will vote for Hamas and 3% for Fateh.

Table 24: If elections were held today, which faction would you vote for according to region, faction, and gender?


	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Hamas	7%	16%	0%	79%	3%	3%	7%	14%
Fateh	45%	47%	92%	3%	6%	17%	55%	37%
PFLP	3%	2%	0%	0%	35%	2%	3%	2%
Islamic Jihad	1%	1%	0%	0%	8%	1%	1%	1%
Others	8%	5%	3%	5%	16%	11%	8%	6%
Will not vote	37%	27%	5%	13%	31%	67%	26%	41%



3. Preferences in case presidential elections were held soon

When asked about preferred personality in presidential elections, 35% said they would vote for the current President Mahmoud Abbas. In second position, with 24% of the respondents, is the imprisoned Fateh leader Marwan Barghouthi and only in 3rd place follows Ismael Hanieh from Hamas with 12%. All other candidates don't play a role in the actual opinion of the surveys respondents.

Figure 25: Preferred personality in presidential elections



When examining the preferences of the West Bank and Gaza respondents for president as well as the preferences according to factional trust, it is noticed that twice as many Fateh supporters opt for Abbas than for Barghouthi. As for Hamas, Ismael Hanieh is unequivocally more supported by Hamas supporters than the leaders that are supposedly on a higher leadership level in Hamas. Support for Muhammad Dahlan is very low, especially in the West Bank

Table 25: Preferred personality in presidential elections according to region, faction, and gender.

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Ismael Hanieh	5%	16%	0%	64%	3%	3%	6%	12%
Muhammad Dahlan	1%	4%	5%	0%	0%	0%	1%	3%
Marwan Barghouthi	19%	16%	27%	4%	30%	12%	23%	13%
Mustapha Barghouthi	5%	4%	3%	5%	14%	5%	5%	5%
Khaled Masha'al	2%	1%	0%	12%	0%	0%	2%	2%
Mahmoud Abbas	24%	30%	51%	1%	10%	14%	31%	22%
Mahmoud Zahhar	0%	1%	0%	3%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Salam Fayyad	5%	1%	6%	1%	0%	2%	4%	3%
Other personality	11%	7%	5%	6%	19%	14%	9%	9%
Will not vote	29%	18%	4%	4%	24%	50%	18%	31%

V. Palestinian Israeli relations

A. The peace process

Despite all the setbacks in negotiation talks, the majority, 66%, of Palestinians in the last three and half years always supported a peace settlement with Israel. Table 27, below, indicates that only Hamas supporters oppose to a peace settlement with Israel. 13% more than female respondents 60% support a peace settlement.

Figure 26: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel




Table 26: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according to region, faction, and gender.


	Region	Factional trust				Gender		
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Support	65%	67%	83%	37%	54%	62%	73%	60%
Oppose	35%	33%	17%	63%	46%	38%	27%	40%



B. Hamas and Israel

Support for peace is also reflected in the position Palestinians have towards Israel. As portrayed in figure 27, below, the majority of 68% of the interviewees mentioned that Hamas should change its position regarding Israel.

Figure 27: Should Hamas maintain its position on the elimination of the state of Israel?



As indicated in the table 27, below, 2/3rd of the interviewees has the opinion that Hamas should change its position on the elimination of the state of Israel. Surprisingly 42% of females compared with 22% of males mentioned that Hamas should maintain its position on eliminating Israel. Inside Hamas approximately 1/3rd think that their faction should change its position regarding Israel.

Table 27: Should Hamas maintain its position on the elimination of the state of Israel according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Hamas should maintain its position on Israel	32%	33%	16%	70%	55%	33%	22%	42%
Hamas should change its position regarding Israel	68%	67%	84%	30%	45%	67%	78%	58%



C. The peace partners

The absolute majority of the Palestinians believe that Israel has no interest in Peace. About 77% are convinced that there is no partner for peace on the Israeli side, and 75% believe that on the Palestinian side there is a partner for peace as illustrated in the figure, below. Even 72% of the Fateh supporters do not believe that Israel is a peace partner for the Palestinians. These results are overviewed in table 28, and 29 below.

Figure 28: Do you think that the Palestinians have a partner for peace on the Israeli side




Table 28: Do you think that the Palestinians have a partner for peace on the Israeli side according to region, faction, and gender.

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Yes	23%	24%	28%	19%	20%	23%	20%	26%
No	77%	76%	72%	81%	80%	77%	80%	74%

Table 29: Do you think that there is a Palestinian partner for peace with Israel according to region, faction, and gender.

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Yes	81%	66%	82%	64%	69%	72%	79%	72%
No	19%	34%	18%	36%	31%	28%	21%	28%



1. Attitude towards President Osama's pressure on Israel

Only 36% of the Palestinians take it seriously that the Obama administration is about to put pressure on Israel to halt the ongoing settlement expansion in the West Bank. Among the factions, 51% of the Fateh supporters believe in the seriousness of President Osama to pressurize Israel to stop settlement expansion. 72% of the none-partisans don't take it seriously, as well as 79% of Hamas partisans.

Figure 29: Seriousness of the Obama administration about putting pressure on Israel to halt settlement expansion.




Table 30: Seriousness of the Obama administration about putting pressure on Israel to halt settlement expansion according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Serious	36%	35%	51%	21%	36%	28%	37%	34%
Not serious	64%	65%	49%	79%	64%	72%	63%	66%

2. Attitude towards negotiations with Israel

When asked about the position stated by President Abbas regarding halting negotiations while Israel Pursues its settlement activities, 92% agree with Abu Mazen's decision to stop the negotiations with Israel as long as they continue to build settlements. Astonishingly, 22% of the Hamas partisans have an opposite opinion.

Figure 30: Support or opposition to Abu Mazen's decision to discontinue the negotiations with Israel as long as it continues to build settlements






Table 31: Support or opposition to Abu Mazen's decision to discontinue the negotiations with Israel as long as it continues to build settlements according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Support	93%	90%	96%	78%	94%	91%	94%	90%
Oppose	7%	10%	4%	22%	6%	9%	6%	10%

VI. The economy

Although the internal security situation is the main issue that the Palestinians are concerned about, the economy is another major concern, particularly the issue of poverty and unemployment.

A. Changes in household economic conditions

The following graphics, below, outline the changes in household economic conditions. Figure 31, below, indicate that 59% think that their financial situation is the same as that of the people in their surrounding. As noted in table 32, below, this view is the same across the three explanatory variables.

Figure 31: Financial comparison between the household and people in the surrounding






Table 32: Financial comparison between the household and people in the surrounding according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Better off than the people in your surrounding	24%	21%	25%	25%	17%	21%	22%	24%
The same as the people in your surrounding	61%	57%	56%	63%	71%	60%	59%	59%
Worse than the people in my surrounding	16%	22%	19%	12%	12%	19%	18%	18%

In response to the question as to how long they can keep up financially in the future, as shown in figure 32, below, 36% of the households mentioned they have the ability to keep up financially for more than one year, 25% say that they can barely manage now with their current income. Clearly, the most vulnerable are the Gaza respondents with 40% stating that they can barely manage now or they do not have enough to live on, as indicated in table 33, below.

Figure 32: Ability to keep up financially in the future




Table 33: Ability to keep up financially in the future according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
For more than one year	41%	27%	36%	43%	28%	34%	34%	37%
For about one year	14%	17%	15%	9%	26%	17%	16%	15%
For only a few months	14%	15%	17%	14%	11%	13%	15%	14%
We can barely manage now	24%	27%	23%	23%	32%	26%	25%	25%
We don't have enough to live on	7%	13%	9%	10%	3%	10%	10%	9%



B. Employment

The situation has changed significantly since February 2009 with respect to employment. Actually the unemployment rate lays at 18% compared with 27% in February 2009. While 30% of the Gazan inhabitants are not employed, the number of unemployed people in the West Bank sits at 15%. The unemployment rate among the different gender is 23% for the male population and 14% for the female population.

Figure 33: Employment status of the respondent.




Table 34: Employment status of the respondent according to region, faction, and gender.

	Region	Factional trust					Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	I trust no faction	Male	Female
Employed full-time	71%	63%	68%	69%	50%	67%	66%	72%
Employed part-time	14%	7%	11%	12%	17%	12%	11%	14%
Not employed	15%	30%	21%	18%	33%	21%	23%	14%

C. Poverty and income

The figure below indicates how fragmented the monthly income of households in the Palestinian society is. Households with less than NIS 500 and households with over NIS 5000 are indicated with approximately 10% through the Palestinian society. 16% of the surveys respondents indicated that their household income is between NIS 2000-2499.



Figure 34: The household monthly income




Figure 35, below, illustrate that 54% of the interviewees said that in the past 6 month their household income remained the same. 36% mentioned that it decreased and 10% said that it increased. Table 35, reveals that 13% more of household in the Gaza Strip felt a decrease of their income compared with the West Bank households.

Figure 35: Evolution in the household income in the past six months?




Table 35: Evolution in the household income in the past six months according to region, faction, and gender?


	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Increased	10%	9%	10%	10%	6%	9%	8%	11%
Decreased	31%	44%	34%	36%	24%	40%	35%	37%
Remained the same	59%	47%	56%	54%	70%	51%	57%	52%



D. Evolution of poverty

The poverty level seems to be rather stable in the last month, exceptionally in February 2009 which was primarily due to the war on Gaza. While the poverty level decreased to the lowest level since 2006, this could be attributed to the resumption of international assistance to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip after the division between the West Bank from the Gaza Strip. Figure 36, below illustrate the decrease of the poverty level, due to the conditions before and after the sanctions were lifted by the international community.

Figure 36: Evolution of poverty level: Mar 2006-Jun 2009



As indicated in table 36, below, the level of poverty is more pronounced in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank. Almost 31% of the population in the Gaza Strip lives in hardship compared with 16% of the West Bank population.

Table 36: Poverty level according to region and factional trust

	Region of residence		Factional trust			
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None
Hardship cases	16%	31%	19%	31%	24%	19%
Below poverty level	27%	24%	22%	25%	27%	28%
Above poverty level	57%	45%	58%	44%	49%	52%



VII. Special focus: Ideology and identity

With the tragedy of the Nakba 1948 and the exodus of the Jews from Europe to Palestine starting in the early 20th century, the Palestinian identity became the indispensable tool to fight for the denial of their political rights.

In the early 1960th, with the establishment of the PLO, the Palestinian case became a symbol for liberation and for the anti-colonial struggle. The Palestinian identity went through a politicization process and was designed as “revolutionary resistance” against the occupation. In the 1970th the PLO implemented several political, cultural and social programs to strengthen and develop a national identity, vis-à-vis an Arabic identity, with the aim of creating an identity seeking liberation and freedom.

After the first Intifada and with the beginning of the Oslo accords, the dream of self-determination in a sovereign state seemed conceivable. However, to date there is no internationally recognized Palestinian state.

The failure of the Palestinian resistance to achieve a Palestinian state culminated in the Oslo Process which, despite the initial support for it, proved to the Palestinians that a state will not come about. Not only that, the Oslo process, with its emphasis on financial incentives and economic improvement, paved the way for a shift towards economic betterment, particularly on the individual level. This allowed for the emergence of Hamas as a potent force in Palestinian politics, which was also helped by the collapse of the bipolar world and the emergence of Islam as a main source of identity that challenged nationalism.

Since the 1990th Hamas strived to broaden the idea of a Palestinian identity into the universal body of Islam. Today most Palestinians see themselves as Muslim first followed by Palestinian first and only a minority as Arab first. The following pages will attempt to address these and other issues pertaining to ideology and feelings towards certain values and the extent to which these views are influenced by identity.

A. Identity

How do the Palestinian identify themselves and which ideologies does the Palestinian population in the oPt follow. Which is the most important aspect concerning religion and integrity in the society? Which governmental system do they prefer?

These questions are requested to the interviewees of the survey in the following pages. As portrayed in figure 37, below, 42% see themselves as Muslims first, followed by their Palestinian identity with 35%, about 16% identify themselves as human beings.



Figure 37: How do you identify yourself?




Table 38, below, indicates that among the regions there is a shift concerning the individual identification. Inside the West Bank the Palestinian and Muslim identity is well balanced at 39%. Among the genders more females, 43%, see themselves as being Muslim first as opposed to Palestinian. As for factional trust, one third of Fateh members identify themselves as Muslims as opposed two thirds of Hamas supporters. The non-partisans are split in between the positions of Fateh and Hamas, although they tilt more towards the position of Fateh than to Hamas.

Table 37: How do you identify yourself according to region, faction, and gender?


	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Palestinian first	39%	29%	45%	21%	37%	30%	40%	31%
Muslim first	39%	48%	34%	69%	35%	41%	40%	43%
Arab first	6%	6%	6%	5%	5%	7%	6%	7%
Human being first	16%	17%	14%	5%	23%	21%	14%	19%
Other	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	0%	0%

B. Religiosity

The majority 61%, of Palestinians characterize themselves as religious people, 14% describe themselves as secular people and about 25% stated other characteristics particularly being religious in the sense of practicing religion while having views that are secular in nature.



Figure 38: Are you a secular or a religious person?



Only 9% of Gaza inhabitants have a secular attitude as opposed to 17% in the West Bank. The biggest factional groups with a secular attitude are the (others), with 21% of their supporters holding secular beliefs. Despite the fact that 51% of Fateh supporters describe themselves as religious, the percentage among the supporters of Hamas reaches 90%. Again, the position of the non-aligned respondents falls between that of Hamas and of Fateh even though it is slightly closer to the latter than to the former. As noted also in table 38, more females describe themselves as religious (68%) than males (52%).

Table 38: Are you a secular or a religious person according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region					Factional trust			Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female		
Secular	17%	9%	20%	3%	21%	10%	19%	10%		
Religious	53%	74%	51%	90%	50%	64%	52%	68%		
Other	30%	17%	29%	7%	29%	26%	29%	22%		

C. Attitude towards the separation of religion and state

The majority, 64%, is against a separation of state and religion. Laicism as a governmental order is only supported by 16% of the survey respondents and an additional 19% who support the separation to a certain extent. Although the majority of all respondents irrespective of their identification are against the separation between



state and religion, it is clear that the opposition is stronger among Hamas supporters, female respondents, and the Gaza Strip respondents. These results are overviewed in detail in table 39, below.

Figure 39: Support or opposition to the separation between state and religion




Table 39: Support or opposition to the separation between state and religion according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Support to a large extent	16%	18%	20%	8%	31%	15%	21%	13%
Support to some extent	22%	15%	28%	11%	11%	15%	24%	16%
Opposed to separation	62%	67%	52%	82%	57%	69%	55%	71%

D. Views about the source of the law

The strong attitudes Palestinian have regarding the separation of state and religion explains why the majority of Palestinians look at the Quran and the Sunna as the sources of law in Palestine. As illustrated in figure 40 and table 40, below, 49% of the respondents mention that they favor the Quran and Sunna as the main source of law for Palestinian society. Only 14% think that civil law should be the only source of law in the oPt. At least 34% prefer that both, the civil law, and the Quran and Sunna should be the sources of the Palestinian legislative system.



Although no differences were observed between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip regarding the source of law in Palestine, the results reveal significant differences between males and females. Whereas 58% of female respondents pointed to the Quran and Sunna as the main sources of the laws in Palestine, the percentage among males was 38%, 20% lower than females. Also, whereas 77% of the Hamas sympathizers prefer the Quran and Sunna to be the source of laws in Palestine, the percentage among the Fateh respondents was 34%.

Figure 40: What should be the main source of law?




Table 40: What should be the main source of law according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Civil law	17%	16%	26%	4%	19%	12%	23%	11%
Quran and Sunna	49%	49%	34%	77%	42%	57%	38%	58%
Both at the same level	34%	35%	40%	20%	40%	31%	38%	31%

E. Evolution of religiosity in Palestine

Clearly, these views Palestinians have about religion and identity developed over a period of the recent history. As discussed in previous NEC surveys, the older Palestinians are the less likely they were to be religious. The strength of the Islamic movement and its effectiveness as well as the failure of traditional regimes to adapt to the younger generations undermined to a large extent the traditional role of nationalistic and pro-western Arab regimes in favor of the Islamic identity and the Islamic vision. Palestine was no exception even though it remained less influenced due to its particularities. Still, the role of religion in recent years has become significantly stronger with over 69% of the respondents saying that religion has a great impact on them and 54% said that it has a great impact on society.



The diagrams, below, indicate the evolution in the role of religion in recent years and the reason for the rise of religious beliefs inside Palestinian society. As noted below, 49% of the respondents say that the role of religion in recent years has increased. A view that is stronger among the respondents trusting Hamas and those residing in the Gaza Strip (table 41).

When asked as the reasons why they feel led to this increase, 30% said that because they have nothing else to turn to beside religion, 20% of the respondents indicated the Israeli occupation as the main reason for the increase in the role of religion and 17% mentioned the rising influence of clergy and religion. At least 14% believe that western hostility toward Islam increased the role of religion in the recent years. Table 42, below, overviews the reasons believed by the various sectors of the Palestinian society to be behind the increasing influence of religion in society in recent years.

Figure 41: Evolution in the role of religion in recent years.




Table 41: Evolution in the role of religion in recent years according to region, faction, and gender.

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Increased	43%	58%	38%	66%	48%	50%	49%	49%
Decreased	36%	30%	41%	25%	41%	31%	32%	36%
Remained the same	21%	11%	21%	8%	11%	19%	19%	16%




Table 42: The main reason behind the increased role of religion in the oPt according to region, faction, and gender.

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Poverty & unemployment	9%	7%	11%	2%	12%	8%	11%	5%
The fear of modernity	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	1%
Influence of clergy/religion	10%	25%	12%	38%	12%	14%	12%	21%
Israeli occupation	19%	22%	23%	17%	12%	23%	18%	22%
Western hostility to Islam	18%	8%	14%	2%	30%	15%	17%	11%
Low education	1%	2%	2%	0%	0%	2%	2%	1%
Moral degradation	2%	4%	1%	4%	0%	3%	3%	2%
Corruption	9%	2%	9%	2%	6%	4%	5%	7%
Nothing else to turn to besides religion	31%	29%	28%	36%	29%	31%	31%	31%

F. Palestinian views about the system of government

Given that the majority of Palestinians favor a system of laws that is based on the Quran and the Sunna, it is surprising to see that when respondents were asked about the system of government they would like Palestine to be modeled after, 36% of the respondents favor a governmental system like one in the other Arab countries. Second mentioned preference is the caliphate system in the oPt. Only 2% want a governmental modeled on the system of the USA, but 14% suggest a European style governmental system. These results are illustrated in figure 42, below.

Figure 42: What system of government should Palestine be modeled on?



As noted in table 43, below, significant differences were observed regarding this issue. Whereas 44% of Fateh supporters and 37% of the supporters that do not trust any faction said that they favored a system like one of those adopted in the other Arab countries while only 12% of Hamas said that. As noted below, 59% of the Hamas supporters preferred a system modeled on the Caliphate system of government, a view that is shared by only 13% of Hamas supporters.



Table 43: What system of government should Palestine be modeled on according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
A caliphate system	26%	26%	13%	59%	39%	27%	20%	31%
A system like one of the European countries	13%	13%	18%	10%	11%	9%	18%	8%
A system like one of the Arab countries	35%	39%	44%	12%	25%	37%	34%	38%
A system like one of the socialist countries	3%	2%	3%	0%	14%	1%	3%	2%
A system like one of the Muslim non Arab countries	6%	4%	5%	2%	9%	6%	7%	3%
Like Israel	1%	3%	1%	0%	0%	3%	3%	1%
Like the US	2%	2%	3%	0%	0%	2%	2%	2%
Other	15%	11%	12%	17%	3%	15%	12%	15%

G. Attitude towards democracy.

To many, the preference of a system of government likes one of the Arab countries, the opposition to the separation, the support for a the Quran and Sunna as the mains sources of the law begs the question as to how do Palestinians feel, then, about democracy. As indicated in figure 43, below, 77% of the surveyed respondents believe that democracy is good for Palestine and would work. This view is shared by the majority of the respondents, including the respondents trusting Hamas, as detailed in table 44.

Figure 43: Is democracy good for Palestine and will it work?






Table 44: Is democracy good for Palestine and will it work according to region, faction, and gender?

		Region		Factional trust				Gender	
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Is democracy good for Palestine	Yes	75%	79%	85%	64%	63%	75%	74%	79%
	No	25%	21%	15%	36%	37%	25%	26%	21%
Can democracy work in Palestine	Yes	64%	67%	71%	59%	68%	62%	61%	69%
	No	36%	33%	29%	41%	32%	38%	39%	31%

H. Perception about democracy

In answering the question raised above regarding how can Palestinians think positively about democracy while at the same time preferring a system of government that is largely inclined towards religion? As noted in figure 47, below, 56% see democracy as a universal system that is applicable to all societies, 24% of the respondents think that democracy is to a certain extent applicable and only 15% don't believe that the democratic system is applicable outside the western societies. Even the majority of Hamas supporters (48%) believe that democracy is a universal system that can be adapted to all societies. Thus, democracy to most Palestinians may not be similar to that adopted in the Western world and that democratic values may be applied while at the same time maintaining religious values.

Figure 44: How do you view democracy?







Table 45: How do you view democracy according to region, faction, and gender?

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
A western political and philosophical school that is applicable to the west	17%	13%	9%	25%	20%	18%	18%	13%
A universal school that is applicable to all societies	52%	63%	61%	48%	56%	55%	52%	59%
A school that can be applied to a certain extent to this	27%	18%	27%	20%	23%	21%	26%	23%
I don't know enough about it	4%	6%	3%	7%	0%	6%	4%	6%

I. Indicators on attitudes towards liberal and democratic values

In understanding further the views Palestinians have about democracy and democratic values, a number of questions were raised to the respondents that provide some indications about issues relevant to democratic principles. These issues relate primarily to individual freedoms, tolerance, and pluralism. Figure 45, below indicates that approximately 2/3rd of the respondents disagree with the idea to oblige women to wear the Hejab. While 77% agree that religion should be the source of laws, 76% agree that political pluralism should be guaranteed in the Palestinian political system and 98% support that religious and tolerance should be taught in school. Surprisingly, the majority, 78%, feel that people should be the source of the law although they also believe that the Quran and the Sunna should be the main source.

Figure 45: Agreement and disagreement with selected liberal indicators



As indicated in table 46, below, most Palestinians, irrespective of their political affiliation, gender, or place of residence support some principles that are essential for democratic governance. Even among Hamas supporters, for example, almost half oppose the



enforcement of the Hejab and 72% support that the people should be the main source of the law. These results are detailed in table 46, below.

Table 46: Agreement and disagreement with selected liberal indicators

		Region		Factional trust				Gender	
		West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
The Hejab should be enforced	Agree	32%	32%	19%	53%	45%	32%	26%	38%
	Disagree	68%	68%	81%	47%	55%	68%	74%	62%
Religion is the source of all laws	Agree	75%	80%	69%	92%	70%	80%	70%	83%
	Disagree	25%	20%	31%	8%	30%	20%	30%	17%
Political pluralism should be guaranteed	Agree	76%	75%	77%	76%	71%	74%	82%	69%
	Disagree	24%	25%	23%	24%	29%	26%	18%	31%
Religious and cultural tolerance should be taught in schools	Agree	98%	99%	99%	97%	97%	98%	98%	99%
	Disagree	2%	1%	1%	3%	3%	2%	2%	1%
People are the source of all laws	Agree	77%	79%	82%	72%	67%	75%	80%	75%
	Disagree	23%	21%	18%	28%	33%	25%	20%	25%

Furthermore, despite the opposition to the separation of state from religion, almost all respondents, 94%, emphasize equality in Palestine between Muslims and Christians in their rights and duties. As noted in table 47, below, even 93% of Hamas supporters hold this view.

Figure 46: Support or opposition to equality in Palestine between Muslims and Christians in their rights and duties




Table 47: Support or opposition to equality in Palestine between Muslims and Christians in their rights and duties according to region, faction, and gender

	Region		Factional trust				Gender	
	West Bank	Gaza Strip	Fateh	Hamas	Others	None	Male	Female
Support	96%	92%	95%	93%	94%	92%	94%	95%
Oppose	4%	8%	5%	7%	6%	8%	6%	5%



J. Concluding remarks

To many, the preceding analysis may be contradictory especially in as far as democracy and religion are concerned. Some may argue as to how Palestinians can support the induction of the Quran and Sunna to become the main source of the law while at the same time calling for the people to be the source of all laws

While NEC will undoubtedly examine this issue further, the authors of this report believe that most Palestinians believe that the people should be the source of the law as long as they are guided by the Quran and the Sunna which are perceived by the majority as the laws of the land. The majority of Palestinians do believe that religion is tolerant and it strives for equal rights, justice and freedom. While religion is the essence and soul behind good governance, democracy may be perceived as the tool for achieving that objective. Palestinians essentially want the people to make laws as long as they are guided by the Quran and the Sunna

