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I. Main findings

- Half the Palestinians are extremely concerned about the situation.
- The level of concern is higher among the Gaza Strip respondents, refugee camp residents and those trusting Fateh.
- The main issue of concern in the West Bank is the economy while the internal power struggle is the main concern in the Gaza Strip.
- Half the Palestinians feel insecure.
- 65% of the respondents support Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister and half of the Palestinians do not trust President Abbas or Ismaiel Hanieh.
- 56% of the Palestinians do not believe that the Palestinian national interest is served by the strategy of either Fateh or Hamas
- More than half the Palestinians do not trust any political or religious faction. The increase in the “non-partisans” appears to be at the expense of Hamas more so than at the expense of Fateh
- The community is perceived to be the main source of constraint on the freedom of expression
- 67% support reaching a peace settlement with Israel. 68% of respondents that do not trust any faction support reaching a peace settlement with Israel
- Two thirds of the Palestinians want Hamas to change its position regarding the existence of the state of Israel. 18% of the respondents are unemployed. Unemployment is higher among the Gaza respondents (25%) and among the extremely poor (55%). Only 8% of the respondents, who do not live in poverty, are unemployed.




II. Introduction and methodology

The survey was conducted between 27-30 April 2009 on a sample of 920 Palestinians over the age of 18 in both the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The data collection method was through telephone interviews. The numbers were randomly selected from all household numbers using random digit dialing.

The results of the survey are compared to the other results obtained from NEC's monthly surveys and are analyzed according to a number of explanatory variables that include region of residence, place of residence, factional trust and gender.

Following are the demographic characteristics of this survey.

Figure 1: Demographic distribution



The results of this survey were cross-referenced against a number of explanatory variables that include gender, age, factional support, region and place of residence.

The margin of error for this survey +/- 3.2% and the confidence level is 95%.



III. The situation in general

A. Level of concern

The level of concern, among the Palestinians over the situation in general, has remained at the same level as in the past month. Still, almost half the Palestinians said that they are extremely concerned about the situation. As noted in tables 1 and 2, below, the level of concern is more pronounced in the Gaza Strip, among the respondents that trust Fateh most, and the respondents who reside in refugee camps.

Half the Palestinians are extremely concerned about the situation. The level of concern is higher among the Gaza Strip respondents, refugee camp residents, and those trusting Fateh. The main issue of concern in the West Bank is the economy while the internal power struggle is the main concern in the Gaza Strip.

Figure 2: Level of concern about the current situation




Table 1: Level of concern about the current situation according to region and faction

| | Region | | | Faction | | |
|--------------------------|-----------|------------|-------|---------|--------|------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None |
| Extremely concerned | 42% | 57% | 54% | 36% | 52% | 46% |
| Concerned to some extent | 45% | 31% | 36% | 48% | 27% | 42% |
| Not very concerned | 10% | 8% | 9% | 12% | 18% | 8% |
| Not concerned at all | 3% | 4% | 1% | 4% | 3% | 4% |



Table 2: Level of concern about the current situation according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | | Place of residence | | |
|--------------------------|--------|--------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------------|---------|--------------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 yrs. | 25-34 yrs. | 35-44 yrs. | 45-54 yrs. | Over 55 yrs. | City | Village | Refugee Camp |
| Extremely concerned | 45% | 50% | 34% | 50% | 54% | 55% | 48% | 45% | 46% | 68% |
| Concerned to some extent | 40% | 40% | 45% | 39% | 38% | 36% | 39% | 41% | 42% | 22% |
| Not very concerned | 12% | 6% | 16% | 7% | 6% | 7% | 9% | 10% | 8% | 7% |
| Not concerned at all | 4% | 3% | 5% | 3% | 3% | 2% | 4% | 3% | 3% | 4% |

Although the internal power struggle was seen as the main reason for concern for the Palestinians in March 2009, the situation in April shifted slightly. In April, the majority of the Palestinians in the oPt attribute their concern more to the economic situation, followed by the internal power struggle, as illustrated in figure 3.

In the Gaza Strip, however, the internal power struggle continues to be the main reason for concern, as opposed to the West Bankers who believe that their main concern is primarily due to the economic situation, as indicated in table 3. As also noted in table 4, below, although they live under the hardest economic conditions, the level of concern over the internal power struggle is higher among the respondents living in the refugee camps. Whereas 27% of the camp respondents said that their main reason for concern is the economic situation, 43% said that it is the internal power struggle.

Figure 3: The main issue that makes you feel concerned: comparison between July 2007 and April 2009






Table 3: Main issue of concern according to region and faction

| | Region | | | Faction | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------|------------|-------|---------|--------|------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None |
| The economic hardship | 36% | 25% | 33% | 23% | 32% | 34% |
| The absence of security | 16% | 15% | 12% | 16% | 19% | 16% |
| The internal power struggle | 25% | 41% | 35% | 29% | 26% | 31% |
| The Israeli occupation | 12% | 12% | 10% | 18% | 11% | 12% |
| Family problems | 2% | 1% | 2% | 1% | 0% | 1% |
| I have no concerns | 8% | 7% | 7% | 12% | 12% | 7% |


Table 4: Main issue of concern according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | | Place of residence | | |
|-------------------------|--------|--------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------------|---------|--------------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 yrs. | 25-34 yrs. | 35-44 yrs. | 45-54 yrs. | Over 55 yrs. | City | Village | Refugee Camp |
| The economic hardship | 31% | 34% | 30% | 35% | 29% | 34% | 38% | 33% | 34% | 27% |
| The absence of security | 14% | 17% | 12% | 14% | 19% | 18% | 10% | 14% | 17% | 14% |
| Internal power struggle | 35% | 26% | 28% | 35% | 31% | 34% | 28% | 32% | 25% | 43% |
| The Israeli occupation | 11% | 14% | 13% | 11% | 14% | 8% | 14% | 12% | 13% | 10% |
| Family problems | 1% | 3% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 1% |
| I have no concerns | 9% | 6% | 14% | 4% | 6% | 4% | 9% | 7% | 9% | 6% |

B. Feeling of insecurity

A 10% drop was noticed in the feeling of insecurity between March 2009 and April 2009. Whereas in March 63% of the respondents said that they felt insecure, the proportion in April who felt insecure was 53%, as outlined in figure 4, below.

Figure 4: Evolution of insecurity May 2007-Apr 2009



Not surprisingly, the highest feeling of insecurity was observed in the Gaza Strip (61%), among the respondents trusting Fateh (59%), among the younger generations, and among the respondents living in refugee camps. These results are detailed in tables 5 and 6, below.



Table 5: Feeling of security according to region and faction

| | Region | | | Faction | | |
|---------------------|-----------|------------|------------|---------|--------|------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None |
| I feel secure | 51% | 39% | 41% | 48% | 50% | 47% |
| I don't feel secure | 49% | 61% | 59% | 52% | 50% | 53% |

Table 6: Feeling of security according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | | Place of residence | | |
|---------------------|--------|--------|--------------|------------|-------|-------|------------|--------------------|---------|------------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | 55 | City | Village | Camp |
| I feel secure | 49% | 44% | 44% | 41% | 47% | 46% | 58% | 51% | 45% | 32% |
| I don't feel secure | 51% | 56% | 56% | 59% | 53% | 54% | 42% | 49% | 55% | 68% |


IV. Palestinian Politics

A. Leadership

Although in relative terms President Abbas enjoys more trust than does Ismael Hanieh among the Palestinian public, about half the Palestinians either do not trust either leader or have refused to answer this question. Overall, only 37% of the Palestinian population trusts Abu Mazen and 13% trusts Ismaiel Hanieh.

Half of the Palestinians do not trust President Abbas or Ismaiel Hanieh

Figure 5: Trust in Mahmoud Abbas versus trust in Ismael Hanieh



As pointed out in table 7 and 8, below, the level of trust in Abu Mazen is higher in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, more among males than females, and among refugee camp residents.

Table 7: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh according to region and faction

| | Region | | | Faction | | |
|---------------|------------|------------|-------|---------|--------|------------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None |
| Abu Mazen | 80% | 67% | 98% | 9% | 83% | 62% |
| Ismael Hanieh | 20% | 33% | 2% | 91% | 17% | 38% |



Table 8: Trust in Abu Mazen vs. trust in Ismael Hanieh according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | | Place of residence | | |
|---------------|--------|--------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------------|---------|--------------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 yrs. | 25-34 yrs. | 35-44 yrs. | 45-54 yrs. | Over 55 yrs. | City | Village | Refugee Camp |
| Abu Mazen | 79% | 68% | 78% | 68% | 77% | 75% | 75% | 76% | 70% | 82% |
| Ismael Hanieh | 21% | 32% | 22% | 32% | 23% | 25% | 25% | 24% | 30% | 18% |

B. The Fayyad administration

As for the support people have to Prime Minister Fayyad, 65% of the respondents said that they do support him as Prime Minister, as noted in figure 6, below.

65% of the respondents said that they do support Fayyad as Prime Minister

Support for the continuation of Fayyad in his position is stronger among the male respondents than among the female respondents, among the supporters of Fateh and among the respondents living in refugee camps.

Figure 6: Level of support for the continuation of Salam Fayyad as prime inister




Table 9: Level of support for the continuation of Salam Fayyad in his post as Prime Minister according to region and faction

| | Region | | | | Faction | | |
|---------|-----------|------------|-------|-------|---------|------|--|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None | |
| Support | 67% | 61% | 87% | 21% | 39% | 58% | |
| Oppose | 33% | 39% | 13% | 79% | 61% | 42% | |

Table 10: Level of support for the continuation of Salam Fayyad in his post as Prime Minister according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | | Place of residence | | |
|---------|--------|--------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------------|---------|--------------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 yrs. | 25-34 yrs. | 35-44 yrs. | 45-54 yrs. | Over 55 yrs. | City | Village | Refugee Camp |
| Support | 70% | 57% | 69% | 62% | 67% | 56% | 66% | 62% | 65% | 69% |
| Oppose | 30% | 43% | 31% | 38% | 33% | 44% | 34% | 38% | 35% | 31% |



C. Factional Support

a. The strategy preferred by Palestinians

Despite the strong negative attitudes people have about Fateh and its practices, still, most Palestinians believe that the vision of Fateh is more consistent with the Palestinian national interest than that of Hamas. As indicated in figure 7, below, of those who answered this question, 75% believe that the Fateh strategy is more appropriate for the Palestinian national interest than the Hamas strategy.

56% of the Palestinians do not believe that the Palestinian national interest is served by the strategy of either Fateh or Hamas

As noted in tables 11 and 12 below, this view is stronger among the older generation respondents and among females. Even among the respondents that do not trust any faction, 62%, as opposed to 38%, feels that the Fateh strategy is more appropriate.

Figure 7: The best strategy to achieve Palestinian national interest: comparison between Jul 2007 and Apr 2009




Table 11: The best strategy to achieve Palestinian national interests according to region and faction

| | Region | | Faction | | | |
|-------|-----------|------------|---------|-------|--------|------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None |
| Fateh | 78% | 72% | 98% | 12% | 63% | 62% |
| Hamas | 22% | 28% | 2% | 88% | 37% | 38% |

Table 12: The best strategy to achieve Palestinian national interests according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | | Place of residence | | |
|-------|--------|--------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------------|---------|--------------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 yrs. | 25-34 yrs. | 35-44 yrs. | 45-54 yrs. | Over 55 yrs. | City | Village | Refugee Camp |
| Fateh | 82% | 65% | 79% | 74% | 74% | 70% | 81% | 74% | 76% | 75% |
| Hamas | 18% | 35% | 21% | 26% | 26% | 30% | 19% | 26% | 24% | 25% |



2. Factional trust

More than half of the respondents said that they do not have trust in any of the existing political or religious factions. As illustrated in figure 8, below, support for Fateh remained at about 33% of the population while the proportion of Palestinians that indicated their trust in Hamas did not exceed 9%. Trust in all other factions and parties¹ reaches no more than 6%.

More than half the Palestinians do not trust any political or religious faction. The increase in the “non-partisans seem to be at the expense of Hamas more so than at the expense of Fateh

Differences in support are not significant according to region of residence or the poverty level. The most striking difference is among gender. Whereas support for Fateh and Hamas is respectively 40% and 7%, support for the two organizations among the female respondents is respectively 26% and 12%, as noted in table 13, below.

Figure 8: Factional trust: Jan 2006 till Apr 2009




Table 13: Factional trust

| | Region | | Poverty | | Gender | |
|--------|-----------|------------|---------------|---------------|--------|--------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Below poverty | Above poverty | Male | Female |
| Fateh | 33% | 34% | 34% | 34% | 40% | 26% |
| Hamas | 9% | 10% | 11% | 7% | 7% | 12% |
| Others | 5% | 6% | 5% | 7% | 6% | 5% |
| None | 52% | 51% | 50% | 52% | 47% | 57% |

¹ Such as Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Islamic Jihad, the DFLP, PPP, FIDA, Al-Mubadara, etc...



Table 14: Factional trust according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Age category | | | | | Place of residence | | |
|--------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------------|---------|--------------|
| | 18-24 yrs. | 25-34 yrs. | 35-44 yrs. | 45-54 yrs. | Over 55 yrs. | City | Village | Refugee Camp |
| Fateh | 37% | 34% | 38% | 22% | 33% | 31% | 36% | 36% |
| Hamas | 7% | 9% | 9% | 13% | 7% | 8% | 11% | 8% |
| Others | 4% | 6% | 5% | 7% | 5% | 7% | 4% | 5% |
| None | 51% | 51% | 48% | 58% | 55% | 53% | 50% | 51% |

D. Attitude towards freedom of expression

About half of the Palestinians believe that they have freedom of expression most of the time. Only 17% of them feel that their freedom of expression is constantly curtailed, as illustrated in figure 9, below.

The highest concern about freedom of expression is observed more clearly in the Gaza Strip where 28% of the respondents there feel that there is no freedom of expression, as opposed to 11% in the West Bank, as indicated in table 15, below. Also note, worthy is the percentage of respondents who are concerned about freedom of expression among refugee camp respondents. As noted in table 16, 30% of refugee camp dwellers stated that there is no freedom of expression.

The majority of Gaza Strip respondents live in refugee camps

Figure 9: Freedom of expression




Table 15: Freedom of expression according to region and factional trust

| | Region of residence | | | Factional trust | | |
|--------------|---------------------|------------|-------|-----------------|--------|------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None |
| All the time | 50% | 41% | 48% | 49% | 51% | 42% |
| Some time | 39% | 31% | 34% | 35% | 31% | 41% |
| Little time | 11% | 28% | 18% | 16% | 18% | 17% |



Table 16: Freedom of expression according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | Place of residence | | | |
|--------------|--------|--------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------------|------|---------|--------------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 yrs. | 25-34 yrs. | 35-44 yrs. | 45-54 yrs. | Over 55 yrs. | City | Village | Refugee Camp |
| All the time | 49% | 45% | 47% | 38% | 42% | 53% | 62% | 46% | 55% | 36% |
| Some time | 33% | 40% | 35% | 45% | 42% | 30% | 22% | 37% | 35% | 35% |
| Little time | 18% | 15% | 17% | 17% | 16% | 16% | 15% | 18% | 10% | 30% |

E. Reasons for constraints on freedom of expression

The majority of the respondents feel that the source of constraint on the freedom of expression is the community. Only 32% attributed this to the government.

The community is perceived to be the main source of constraint on the freedom of expression

The impact of the community on freedom of expression is more pronounced by West bankers (56%), Hamas supporters (62%), female respondents and respondents that are below the age of 25. Whereas 44% of the male respondents pointed to the community as the reason for their inability to express their opinions, the percentage among the female respondents reaches 58%.

Figure 10: The constraints that limit freedom of expression




Table 17: The constraints that limit freedom of expression according to region and faction

| | Region of residence | | | Factional trust | | |
|--------------|---------------------|------------|-------|-----------------|--------|------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None |
| Family | 13% | 10% | 15% | 8% | 7% | 12% |
| School | 1% | 3% | 2% | 0% | 0% | 3% |
| Government | 28% | 41% | 41% | 22% | 54% | 28% |
| Community | 56% | 41% | 40% | 62% | 39% | 55% |
| The managers | 2% | 5% | 3% | 8% | 0% | 2% |



Table 18: The constraints that limit freedom of expression according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | | Place | | |
|--------------|--------|--------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|-------|---------|--------------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 yrs. | 25-34 yrs. | 35-44 yrs. | 45-54 yrs. | Over 55 yrs. | City | Village | Refugee Camp |
| Family | 9% | 14% | 14% | 13% | 12% | 13% | 3% | 9% | 13% | 17% |
| School | 2% | 2% | 3% | 1% | 1% | 1% | 3% | 1% | 2% | 3% |
| Government | 42% | 23% | 25% | 33% | 32% | 38% | 43% | 31% | 31% | 40% |
| Community | 44% | 58% | 55% | 49% | 52% | 47% | 48% | 55% | 52% | 31% |
| The managers | 3% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 4% | 1% | 2% | 3% | 0% | 8% |

V. Palestinian-Israeli relations

A. Support for peace

An 8% increase in support for peace was observed between March and April 2009. Whereas 59% of the respondents in March 2009 indicated their support for a peace agreement with Israel, the percentage in April increased to 67%.

Support for peace with Israel is stronger among the respondents trusting Fateh (79%) than among the respondents trusting Hamas (26%), among males (73%) more so than females (60%), and among the older generation (71%) more so than among the younger generation (51%). Interestingly, support for peace agreement is relatively high among the respondents that do not support any faction. As indicated in table 19, their position on this issue is closer to that of Fateh supporters than the Hamas supporters.

68% of respondents that do not trust any faction support reaching a peace settlement with Israel

Figure 11: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel






Table 19: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according to region and faction

| | Region | | | Faction | | | |
|---------|-----------|------------|-------|---------|--------|------|--|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None | |
| Support | 68% | 64% | 79% | 26% | 51% | 68% | |
| Oppose | 32% | 36% | 21% | 74% | 49% | 32% | |

Table 20: Support or opposition to a peace settlement with Israel according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | | Place of residence | | |
|---------|--------|--------|--------------|-------|-------|-------|---------|--------------------|---------|------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 | 25-34 | 35-44 | 45-54 | 55 yrs. | City | Village | Camp |
| Support | 73% | 60% | 51% | 68% | 74% | 73% | 71% | 68% | 64% | 70% |
| Oppose | 27% | 40% | 49% | 32% | 26% | 27% | 29% | 32% | 36% | 30% |

B. Attitude towards Hamas’s position towards Israel

Two thirds of the Palestinians remain consistent about the perceptions they have towards the position of Hamas regarding the existence of Israel. As noted in figure 9, 65% of the Palestinians believe that Hamas should change its position vis-à-vis the existence of the state of Israel. Females (41%), more than males (29%), believe that Hamas should maintain its position regarding the elimination of the state of Israel. Similarly, as indicated in table 22, this view is also stronger among the young respondents than the older respondents. Respondents that do not trust any faction are more in tandem with the position of Fateh supporters than with the Hamas supporters on this position. Whereas only 24% of Hamas supporters want Hamas to change its position towards Israel, the percentage is 66% among the respondents that do not trust any faction.

Two thirds of the Palestinians want Hamas to change its position regarding the existence of the state of Israel

Figure 12: Attitude about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the






Table 21: Attitude about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of the Israel according to region and faction

| | Region | | | Faction | | |
|---|-----------|------------|-------|---------|--------|------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None |
| Hamas should maintain its position on Israel | 34% | 37% | 17% | 76% | 44% | 34% |
| Hamas should change its position regarding Israel | 66% | 63% | 83% | 24% | 56% | 66% |

Table 22: Attitude about whether Hamas should maintain its position on the elimination of the Israel according to gender, age category and place of residence

| | Gender | | Age category | | | | | Place of residence | | |
|---|--------|--------|--------------|------------|------------|------------|--------------|--------------------|---------|--------------|
| | Male | Female | 18-24 yrs. | 25-34 yrs. | 35-44 yrs. | 45-54 yrs. | Over 55 yrs. | City | Village | Refugee Camp |
| Hamas should maintain its position on Israel | 29% | 41% | 45% | 41% | 30% | 26% | 30% | 37% | 33% | 27% |
| Hamas should change its position regarding Israel | 71% | 59% | 55% | 59% | 70% | 74% | 70% | 63% | 67% | 73% |

VI. The economy

A. Poverty conditions

The results from April reveal that the poverty level² has remained almost the same as that of March. About 48% of the respondents' households live in poverty. The highest level of poverty is in the Gaza Strip. Whereas the results show that 43% of the West Bank respondents live in poverty, the percentage who falls in this category in the Gaza Strip reaches 58%.

48% of the respondents' households live in poverty

As indicated in table 23, below, the highest level of poverty was in among the refugee camp residents and among the respondents who trust Hamas most. Whereas in cities and villages the poverty rate is respectively 44% and 51%, the percentage of respondents who live in poverty in refugee camps approaches 61%. Also, whereas the poverty level among the Fateh supporters and the respondents who do not trust any faction is 49% and 47%, the percentage among the Hams supporters is 59%, as detailed in tables 23, below.

² Poverty level here is based on the reported income and the poverty line is based on about US\$ 500 to a reference family of two adults and four dependents.



Figure 13: Evolution of poverty March 2006-Apr 2009




Table 23: Poverty level according to region and place of residence and factional trust

| | Region | | Place | | | | Factional trust | | |
|-------------------------|-----------|------------|-------|---------|------|-------|-----------------|--------|------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | City | Village | Camp | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None |
| Below poverty; | 43% | 58% | 44% | 51% | 61% | 49% | 59% | 37% | 47% |
| Of which extremely poor | 11% | 27% | 13% | 16% | 29% | 14% | 20% | 21% | 21% |
| Above poverty | 57% | 42% | 56% | 49% | 39% | 51% | 41% | 63% | 53% |

B. The labor market

A slight drop in the unemployment situation was observed in April. As illustrated in figure 14, below, the percentage of respondents who said that they are without a job in April was 18%, as compared to 27% in February and 24% in March. The higher level of unemployment during the beginning of the year may be explained by the Israeli military attacks on the Gaza Strip.

Again, the differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are very clear in as far as some economic indicators are concerned. As pointed out in table 24, below, the proportion of unemployed respondents in the Gaza Strip is 25% while the proportion among the Westbankers is 14%.



Further examination of the results reveals that there is a strong correlation between poverty and the employment situation of the respondents. As also noted in table 24, of those who were deemed as extremely poor, 55% said that they were unemployed. Conversely, only 8% of the respondents that are above the poverty line stated that they were unemployed. Surprisingly, however, only 4% of the respondents trusting Hamas said that they were unemployed as opposed to 23% of the respondents that trust Fateh. A possible explanation to that is that support for Hamas is stronger among the respondents that are not part of the labor force: students and housewives.

Unemployment is higher in the Gaza Strip and among the respondents that live in poverty

Figure 14: The employment situation




Table 24: Labor force according to region, poverty, factional trust, and gender

| | Region | | Poverty | | | Factional trust | | | Gender | | |
|--------------------|-----------|------------|----------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|-------|--------|--------|------|--------|
| | West Bank | Gaza Strip | Extremely poor | Below poverty | Above poverty | Fateh | Hamas | Others | None | Male | Female |
| Fully employed | 67% | 63% | 19% | 61% | 80% | 64% | 84% | 78% | 68% | 71% | 48% |
| Partially employed | 19% | 12% | 26% | 20% | 12% | 13% | 12% | 4% | 16% | 14% | 27% |
| Unemployed | 14% | 25% | 55% | 19% | 8% | 23% | 4% | 18% | 16% | 16% | 25% |
